Conclusion

Europol is fast becoming established as a serious player in the fight against trans-national crime. Early adventures into international police co-operation such as TREVI in the 1970s started a process that is undeniably consistent with Neo-Functionalism’s Spillover Effect. It is interesting to note that in order for police forces to tackle a single area of crime, such as the fight against drugs, a number of other areas of crime also have to be targeted. In the case of drugs, for example, the Europol Drugs Unit needed an extension of its mandate to cover organised crime and illicit immigration networks in order to effectively act against drugs. This example illustrates one of the difficulties police forces have in fighting the ‘new’ forms of crime in that national responses are no longer sufficient, if they ever were, to combat cross-border crime. By its very nature, cross-border crime requires a cross-border solution. If criminals are operating between countries and across national frontiers then it seems only logical that law enforcement agencies must also follow suit.

Europol, however, is not and should never be seen as the solution to the problem of trans-national crime. While it has certainly plays an important role, it will not on its own and in its present form offer a lasting solution to a problem which it is generally accepted will get worse before it gets better. Expansion of its duties seems an appropriate remedy for some of Europol’s immediate problems but is only a short term measure to tackle a long term problem. Ultimately, however, if Europol is to assume a greater role in European policing then it must become accountable to the European demoi rather than fifteen separate peoples who remain oblivious to its existence as is presently the case.

The European Union is plagued by a democratic deficit, which Europol sometimes regards itself immune to due to its intergovernmental character. It is not, however, separate from the same problems that afflict the European Commission and European Parliament, i.e. absence of international scrutiny and popular control. Europol’s recent submission of two annual reports, one classified for public viewing and the other a ‘limited’ version with restricted readership is, for instance, one such trend that should immediately be reversed. Of course any law enforcement organisation should have the freedom to balance operational security with public accountability, but these limits should be first set by reasoned political authorities and not by the organisation itself. Expansion of Europol’s powers without the same attention given to the possibility of increasing political and judicial accountability will consequently serve to make Europol just as big a part of the problem as part of the solution.

It seems likely that Europol will continue to develop from its present form and as it matures will be able to play a greater role in the fight against transnational crime. If Europol is to become the primary response of European states to the scourge of cross-border crime then the mechanisms it employs and the way in which it operates must be subject to a greater scrutiny and accountability. Greater transparency will most likely bring with it an increased public knowledge of its operations and a greater willingness on behalf of governments, police forces and the public at large to accept expansion of its operational jurisdictions and powers. What seems certain, however, is that as long as individuals, governments and organisations continue to call for the expansion of powers of Europol this debate will continue and transnational crime will exploit it.

The opinions expressed here are those of the author and not of the University of Exeter or the European Police Office (Europol).