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Conclusions

On the whole, therefore, this website has been concerned with the illicit and outright illegal transfer of small arms and light weapons inside the European Union, and also to other parts of the world from the European Union itself. However, as I have pointed out before, the legal trade in weapons also needs to be taken account of when measures to control the spread of S.A.L.W are being discussed. Weapons that begin in the legal sphere of the trade often end up being transferred or used illicitly and illegally.  

Whilst I have covered the various E.U action and policies regarding S.A.L.W and assessed how effective they have been, I have not yet answered the question of why this collective action and integration has taken place. Before I deal with that question it is perhaps more appropriate to ask why it has taken so long for E.U members to reach common agreement on action to combat the spread of S.A.L.W? Scappucci points out that issues under the ‘Justice and Home Affairs (JHA)’ category are ‘very sensitive areas which are closely linked to the sovereignty of Member States.’ As a result, E.U members were initially very reluctant to cooperate in these areas but, according to Scappucci, have been pushed to do so since the late 1980s for two main reasons. Firstly, the completion of the internal market and consequent removal of internal border controls had to coincide with measures to prevent drug traffickers (or in the case of this website, S.A.L.W traffickers), terrorists and criminals benefiting from the free movement of goods, persons, capital and services. I have already mentioned this issue, and pointed out that the entry into force of the Schengen agreement did indeed facilitate the illegal transport and handling of firearms. Hix also notes that the removal of borders makes it very difficult for national governments to pursue independent policies to control international crime.[1] The second reason for integration in the arena of JHA that Scappucci cites is the increasing cross-border threat posed by terrorism and international organised crime.[2] Other authors have also mentioned the increase in international organised crime, including arms trafficking, in the late 1980s and early 1990s, a moderate increase being cited in E.U states specifically.[3] These interpretations seem to fit with neofunctionalist observations of European integration, emphasising as they do the way in which political integration and the growth of authority at the supranational level occur as a long-term consequence of modest economic integration. Integration in one sector creates pressures for integration in related sectors, a process termed as functional spillover.[4]  

Therefore, long term economic integration and increasing international crime meant it was no longer feasible for Member State governments to pursue independent policies in the arena of JHA, including arms trafficking. However, this still doesn’t explain why the growth in impetus for increased integration and supranational policy-making in this area seemed to occur around the time of the Amsterdam Treaty. Amsterdam has been seen by some commentators as marking the time when E.U states finally seemed to recognise the need to tackle such an important concern as the illicit and illegal trafficking of S.A.L.W, and it wasn’t until after this that key initiatives, such as the Programme for Preventing and Combating the Illicit Trafficking in Conventional Arms, began to be put in place.[5] 

Again, Hix is useful here. He cites several reasons for E.U governments agreeing to ‘inject a significant dose of supranational agenda-setting, scrutiny, adoption and enforcement’ in the JHA policy area at Amsterdam. The Amsterdam Treaty is interpreted as a common response of governments to a number of forces, for example new demands amongst electorates for immediate action to fight cross-border crime and immigration, giving E.U governments a window of opportunity to integrate on high politics. Pressure from NGOs, the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice for greater transparency and accountability of decision-making is also referred to. Finally, Hix points out that the establishment of policy expertise for JHA by the European Commission meant the opportunity for E.U governments to delegate agenda-setting and enforcement powers to an independent and credible institution, thus solving a collective action problem.[6] 

Although the rise in international crime has been stated as a long-term reason for greater collective action in the arena of JHA, as far as S.A.L.W are concerned, the amount of weapons entering the E.U is not great. A relatively small number of S.A.L.W enter the E.U compared to other parts of the world and although their use by terrorist and criminal groups does pose a threat to public safety, it is not likely to result in any collapse of state order. Instead, the problem that S.A.L.W pose for the E.U is more of a potential threat, and something which needs to be dealt with in order to prevent facing graver problems in the future. The detrimental effects of S.A.L.W mentioned throughout this website, such as greater privatisation of security, greater burdens on medical services, and higher firearm related death rates, are still minimal in the E.U, but do have the potential to be a greater problem. The trade to other parts of the world and the procurement there of S.A.L.W also poses a problem for the E.U. What were once considered to be internal conflicts, fuelled and prolonged by vast amounts of S.A.L.W, threaten international peace and stability, eventually requiring international involvement to keep the peace. Unfortunately, the problems posed by S.A.L.W for the E.U are likely to get worse as both the Union and Schengen Rim expand to the East and South-East. As external borders are extended outwards and become the responsibility of new members, new opportunities will inevitably be presented to those who seek to smuggle S.A.L.W. 

This means that the response of the E.U needs to be extended even further in the future. Whilst initiatives and collective action to increase control over legal, illicit, and illegal arms transfers have been widely criticised as being limited in scope, it should be remembered that they do represent the first such mechanisms applied by any group of states to their conventional arms exports.[7] As such, they should be seen as something of a first step form which progress can be made, rather than a final result. The E.U, along with the U.N, is leading the way as far as limiting the transfer and proliferation of S.A.L.W is concerned and although they have made a start, a lot still remains to be done in order to rid countries across the globe from the scourge of small arms and light weapons.

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