4 Brentano on the mind

INTRODUCTION

Brentano’s writings on the philosophy of mind or descriptive psychology have a number of distinctive features, all of which are connected with his understanding of what a part of theoretical philosophy is and ought to be, with his understanding of the relation between the philosophy of mind and experimental psychology, and with the success and thoroughness of his contribution to philosophy. First, his philosophy of mind always makes use of a carefully worked out ontological framework, indeed of at least two such frameworks. Secondly, he invariably argues at some length, sometimes at very great length, for his views. Thirdly, he often takes great pains to relate his views to those of the philosophical tradition, sometimes in order to argue against these views, sometimes in order to make clear just where he is building on the tradition and just where he is departing from it. Finally, Brentano attaches great importance to the fact that the answers to even apparently unimportant or minute questions of descriptive psychology often turn out to be heavy with consequences for all parts of metaphysics and epistemology (cf. USP, p. 79, MWO, p. 39). Failure to notice subtle distinctions in descriptive psychology is often the first step in the construction of metaphysical edifices which turn although nothing turns with them. This conviction, like the role of ontological frameworks in his work, reflects the fact that Brentano was primarily a metaphysician and only secondarily a philosopher of mind.

Brentano’s conception of the philosophy of mind owes much to his views about the development of experimental psychology in the last quarter of the nineteenth century. Psychology, he repeats, like
many of his contemporaries, is in an immature state, it is a young science. Unlike his contemporaries, he thinks that conceptual confusions and experiments coexist uneasily within psychology. One reason for the immaturity of psychology is the fact that psychology must wait on advances in physiology. But it is the “science of the future.” Although the practical activity of rooting out conceptual confusions is an important philosophical task, Brentano thought that it was best carried out by developing a theoretical, descriptive psychology which would underpin explanatory psychology, which Brentano calls “genetic psychology.” The latter depends on physiology and physics, whereas descriptive psychology is “relatively free” of this dependence.\(^1\) To say that descriptive psychology is, like explanatory psychology, a theoretical discipline is to say that it consists of a system of interconnected truths. It is not a practical discipline, a collection of truths the unity of which derives from some practical goal external to them – for example that of rooting out conceptual confusions. It is essential, Brentano argued, for descriptive psychology and other branches of philosophy to maintain contact with the natural sciences. Thus descriptive psychology does not exclude experiments.\(^2\) Indeed Brentano devised experiments for scientists to carry out (for the great Prague psychologist Ewald Hering).

What Brentano calls “explanatory” and “genetic” psychology corresponds to what is today called empirical psychology and cognitive science; it seeks to establish empirical laws which report relations of succession between phenomena. What he called descriptive psychology corresponds to what is now called philosophy of mind or philosophical psychology. (Confusingly enough, Brentano says his descriptive psychology is “empirical” since, as we shall see, he thinks it is based on perception, inner perception \(\text{[PES-E, p. 34, PES-G, I, p. 48]}\).) Descriptive psychology consists in large measure of conceptual truths about and analyses of psychological phenomena in which classifications, the identification of the fundamental types of psychological phenomena, and claims about relations of necessary coexistence are prominent. Descriptive and explanatory questions are clearly distinguished by Brentano in 1874,\(^3\) the labels “descriptive psychology” and “explanatory psychology” followed later.

Descriptive psychology is not only distinct from explanatory psychology it is also prior to it. For theories about the causes and effects of, say, visual perception presuppose some account of the nature of
visual perception. Failure to distinguish between descriptive and genetic psychology leads philosophers and psychologists to substitute for analyses of psychological phenomena genetic and often causal claims. Thus philosophical accounts of phantasy invariably emphasize that it is an act which originates in perception (GA, pp. 58, 68). The senses are distinguished from one another by reference to the antecedents of sensory appearances or to bodily organs (GA, pp. 199–201). True or false, such genetic claims make no contribution to an analysis of the mind, to an account of the “inner kinship and difference” (GA, p. 201) between mental phenomena. Description of psychological phenomena yields exact and exceptionless laws, unlike the explanations of genetic psychology which “specify the conditions under which the individual phenomena are bound up causally” (DP-G, p. 1). Although the laws of descriptive psychology “may exhibit a gap here and there, as is indeed also the case in mathematics” “they allow and require a precise formulation” (DP-G, p. 4). One putative example of such a law is that the appearance of violet is identical with that of red-blue. Causal laws – Brentano’s example is the claim that the stimulus of a point on the retina by a light-ray with vibrations of a particular frequency produces the appearance of something blue – are subject to exceptions, such as color blindness, the severing of a nerve or hallucinations (DP-G, p. 5).

The first of the two main ontological frameworks employed by Brentano is traditional in its commitments: mental phenomena and acts belong to the category of individual accidents, non-repeatable particulars which are not substances (what are today sometimes called “particularized properties” or “tropes”), their bearers to the category of substances. Brentano frequently refers to psychological phenomena in German by using nominalized infinitives which are best put into English with the help of gerunds. Thus Brentano in English talks of presentings and judgings, loving, and hating – the three fundamental types of psychological accidents. If the effect is that produced by a a list of the novels of Henry Green – the author of Loving, Living, and Doting – it has at least the advantage of clarity and eliminates the act-object ambiguities to which such expressions as “judgment” and “presentation” give rise.

This first framework is less traditional in its account of the way psychological accidents hang together – via relations of dependence and containment between accidents. Brentano’s second framework
mirrors his conviction from around 1905 that the traditional category of individual accidents is empty. Rather, argues Brentano, we are ontologically committed to substances and only to these, however richly they are qualified. In the language of the first framework, every affective accident, every liking, loving, or pleasure depends on some presenting or idea. In the revised version, every liker, lover, or pleasure-feeler depends on and includes some presenter or ideator. Since accounts of Brentano’s ontological frameworks are available in this volume and elsewhere, I shall say no more about them and simply employ the first framework, the one which is closer to ordinary language.4

I shall also, for the sake of brevity, put on one side the numerous arguments Brentano gives for his views, except occasionally when an argument helps to understand the content of these views, although these arguments account for an important part of the interest of Brentano’s philosophy of mind. Finally, I ignore Brentano’s numerous and remarkable discussions of the history of the philosophy of mind.5 What remains? The meat. But even here a choice has to be made. I omit most of the details of Brentano’s account of the different objects of the mind, except where features of these objects are used to describe mental phenomena. I omit his accounts of the ways the mind relates to its objects – his theories of “intentionality” – and his analyses of judgings.6 After a survey of the main claims and distinctions made by Brentano in his account of the mind, I consider in some detail what he says about what he takes to be the groundfloor and the top floor of the mind – time-consciousness and the emotions. I then set out his accounts of the self. In view of the difficulties involved in navigating amongst Brentano’s texts, changing views, and opinionated editors, I indicate the main developments of Brentano’s views about the mind. In spite of the fact that, in 1889, he seems to have thought that descriptive psychology was almost complete (KRW, p. ix, USE, p. 3), these developments ended only with his death.

**PSYCHOLOGICAL PHENOMENA AND INNER PERCEIVING PERSPICUOUSLY REPRESENTED**

Presentings, judgings, loavings, and hatings are “psychological” or “mental phenomena”. Brentano sometimes calls these phenomena
“acts” (PES-E, p. 79, PES-G, I, p. 111) and “activities” although every mental phenomenon has a cause and so belongs to the category of undergoings (passio, Leiden).

What are psychological phenomena? They are, first, phenomena we are aware of in inner perception. Secondly, they are phenomena which have, relate to, or refer to (sich beziehen auf) objects. Physical phenomena, a category which Brentano takes to comprehend colors, sounds, and their ilk rather than explosions, do not have objects. And thirdly, psychological phenomena are either presentings or based on presentings (PES-E, p. 80, PES-G, I, p. 112). Finally, Brentano distinguishes between psychological phenomena and their structures, on the one hand, and psychological dispositions, for example irritability, on the other hand. Such dispositions are bound up with laws, in particular the laws of genetic psychology, and it is important not to lose sight of the relevant laws in talking of dispositions, something it is all too easy to do if one mistakenly takes dispositions to be real entities (GA, pp. 54–6).

What is the extension of the concept psychological phenomenon? Brentano’s answer appeals initially to the different ways in which psychological phenomena relate intentionally to their objects and asserts that there are three fundamental classes: presentings, judgings, and affective-cum-volitive phenomena. Judgings come in two basic kinds – acceptings and rejectings. To judge that Jules is jubilant is for a presenting of jubilant Jules to be qualified by an accepting. To judge that Jules is not jubilant is for a presenting of the same type to be qualified by a rejecting. Later, Brentano added to the distinction between accepting and rejecting a further distinction between attributing (Zuerkennen) and denying (Absprechen) something of something. Judging, then, is not a propositional attitude. Throughout all the developments of his analysis of judging he almost always retains the claim that the presentations which provide judgings with their “matter” do not contain negation. Like judgings, affective relations (Gemütsbeziehungen) come in polarly opposed kinds – loving and hating. But within the class of presentings no such polarly opposed kinds are to be found.

He seems to have held this view in 1869/70 and, in spite of occasional wavering, held on to it until the end. However, as we shall see (in the next section), he changed his mind about what it means to say that his tripartite classification is “fundamental.”
Brentano’s third claim about the nature of psychological phenomena—each such phenomenon is a presenting or is based on a presenting—is a consequence of the thesis that there are just three basic types of mental phenomena and his main claim about the relations between these—every affective phenomenon and every judging depends on some presenting.

Brentano’s first claim about the nature of mental phenomena was that we are aware of them in inner perception. What, then, is inner perception? And are inner perceivings not themselves mental phenomena?

We perceive both physical phenomena and the psychological phenomena “in” us. In neither case do we only enjoy presentings. In each type of perceiving, outer and inner, we judge. But the two types of perceiving differ so much in cognitive dignity that Brentano often prefers to reserve the term “perception” (Wahrnehmung) for inner perception.

Inner perception is the first source of knowledge for the psychologist (PES-E, p. 34, PES-G, I, p. 48). It is a piece of knowledge, an immediate unmotivated apprehension (Erkenntnis) that some presented, for example intuited, real and individual entity exists. To perceive is therefore to judge and the judgment is positive and immediately self-evident. Thus only inner perception, for example my inner perceiving of my judging or willing, merits the name, neither “so called external perception nor memory grasp their object with immediate self-evidence.” Inner perception is characterized by “that immediate, incorrigible self-evidence which it alone possesses of all types of knowledge of objects of experience” (PES-E, p. 91, PES-G, I, p. 128). External perception does not give us the right to assume that physical phenomena exist. On the other hand, external perception does not tell us that colors cannot exist without being presented (PES-E, p. 93, PES-G, I, p. 130).

Similarly, in inner perception, mental phenomena are perceived as having certain properties. But Brentano does not think that if inner perception does not reveal something to have a certain property, then it follows that it does not have this property. Inner perception only “says that what it shows to us is really present, it does not say that there are no features it hides” (EG §436, DG, p. 416). Thus, although inner perception does not reveal psychological phenomena to be spatial, we cannot conclude from this that they are not spatial.
Is inner perception itself not a psychological phenomenon? Is inner perception, for example, of hearing a tone not just as much a psychological phenomenon as the hearing? In 1874 Brentano combines an affirmative answer to this question and his claim that every psychic phenomenon is given in inner perception in the following way:

The presentation of the sound and the presentation of the presentation of the sound form a single mental phenomenon, it is only by considering it in its relation to two different objects, one of which is a physical phenomenon and the other a mental phenomenon, that we divide it conceptually into two presentations. In the same mental phenomenon in which the sound is present to our minds we simultaneously apprehend the mental phenomenon itself. (PES-E, p. 127, PES-G, I, p. 179)

When I hear a sound the sound is the “primary” object of the hearing and the hearing is its own “secondary” object:

Apart from the fact that it presents the physical phenomenon of sound, the mental act of hearing becomes at the same time its own object and content, taken as a whole. (PES-E, p. 129, PES-G, I, p. 182)

Since inner perceiving is a judging, there are no judgment-free mental phenomena. Brentano endorsed the main features of this account of inner perceiving early and late (SNC, p. 7, PES-G, III, p. 8) but changed his mind on two points.

In 1874 he thought not only that whenever a psychological phenomenon occurs a judging and so a presenting occurs, but also that an emotion must occur. He makes this claim in a passage which forcefully states what he took to be the true multiplicity of any mental episode:

Every mental act is conscious, it includes within it a consciousness of itself. Therefore, every mental act, no matter how simple, has a double object, a primary and a secondary object. The simplest act, for example the act of hearing, has as its primary object, the sound, and for its secondary object, itself, the mental phenomenon in which the sound is heard. Consciousness of this secondary object is three-fold: it involves a presentation of it, a cognition of it and a feeling towards it. Consequently, every mental act, even the simplest, has four different aspects under which it may be considered. It may be considered as a presentation of its primary object, as when the act in which we perceive a sound is considered as an act of hearing, however,
it may also be considered as a presentation of itself, as a cognition of itself, and as a feeling towards itself. In addition, in these four respects combined, it is the object of its self-presentation, of its self-cognition, and (so to speak) of its self-feeling. Thus, without any further complication and multiplying of entities, not only is the self-presentation presented, the self-cognition is known as well as presented, and the self-feeling is felt as well as known and presented.¹⁴

Brentano subsequently abandoned the claim that every mental episode involves an affective element.¹⁵

Brentano’s second modification of the above account of inner perceiving distinguishes between inner perceiving in a narrow sense, as above, and in a wide sense. Any account of self-evident inner perception has to deal with the objection that the inner perceptions of even the most fervent fans thereof are not concordant. Brentano thought that such disagreements stem not from inner perception as presented so far but from what he called “inner perception in the wider sense.” Inner perception in the narrow sense is essentially confused although self-evident. To perceive is not to notice or distinguish or compare, it is not to apperceive. Confusion is dissipated by apperception, or noticing.¹⁶ To notice is to judge, it is therefore not to be confused with being struck by something, which is an affective state, or with something’s being conspicuous. Something can be noticed without being conspicuous. But nothing strikes us without being noticed. Being struck by something is not to be confused with attending or paying heed, which is a desire. Attending or paying heed differs from keeping or bearing in mind. Noticing admits of no degrees, unlike being struck by something and keeping or bearing something in mind [DP-E, pp. 37ff., DP-G, pp. 35ff.].

Brentano’s account of apperception or noticing not only allows him to complement his account of inner perception in the narrow sense but also to give a subtle account of what is perceived and noticed or not noticed in sensory perception, in particular in the case of optical illusions [USP, passim]. It is also very useful in his campaign to show that mental phenomena – but not the psychological dispositions mentioned above – are always conscious. Some of the phenomena which are said to be unconscious are merely unnoticed but conscious [PES-E, pp. 102ff., PES-G, I, pp. 143ff.].

Inner perception is not inner observation, for the latter modifies where it does not destroy its object, says Brentano in 1874. He seems
never to have changed his mind on this point. Is inner perceiving in the wide sense a type of inner observation? Does it modify, not the existence of its object, which is guaranteed by the inner perceiving in the narrow sense on which apperception builds, but the features of its object? It is not clear what Brentano’s answers to these questions are.

**Six distinctions**

Inner perception in the narrow sense, we saw, yields self-evidence and is a piece of unmotivated knowledge. The distinctions *self-evident vs. blind, motivated vs. unmotivated*, like the distinctions *sensory vs. noetic, assertoric vs. apodictic, direct vs. oblique*, and the already mentioned distinction between *primary* and *secondary* objects, make up a family of six distinctions. Together with his ontological frameworks they allow Brentano to provide various perspicuous representations of the mind.

An apodictic judging is always a denying of something as impossible. An assertoric judging is an accepting or denying without any such modal moment. It is either a mere opinion (presumption) or assured (LRU, p. 112). The feature of *self-evidence* is simple and so can only be introduced by means of examples and by contrasting self-evidence with the vastly more frequent phenomenon of the blind, instinctive tendency to believe something which is typical of external perception and memory; the latter but not the former exhibits differences of degrees (SNC, pp. 4ff., 15, PES-G, III, pp. 3ff., 19–20). Both self-evident judgings and assured judgings are often called certain, but the two certainties are very different (LRU, p. 112).

A judging is motivated if and only if it is immediately caused by another psychological phenomenon and this relation of causation is perceived by the judger (LRU, p. 112). Inner perceiving is unmotivated but self-evident. Motivation and self-evidence come together in all those judgings which yield a priori knowledge. In such cases consideration of, for example, certain concepts causes a self-evident judging.

Analogues of these distinctions, Brentano thinks, are exhibited in the sphere of loving and hating. There are blind, instinctive pro-attitudes but also a hating which is characterized as correct (affective self-evidence). A preference for cognition over error which is not only characterized as correct but as necessarily correct is an example of
affective, apodictic self-evidence. Similarly, there is motivated and unmotivated hating, as when something is hated for the sake of something else or for its own sake (SNC, pp. 42–3, PES-G, III, p. 55). It is the contrasts between blind and self-evident judgings and between blind and correct affective attitudes which provide Brentano with the beginnings of an account of the dynamics of the mind which involves more than merely causal claims. For, he thinks, many of our changes of mind are rooted in our coming to notice such contrasts (FCE, p. 131, GAE, pp. 145–6).

Brentano’s distinction between psychological phenomena which are sensory and those which are intellectual or noetic (SNC, pp. 56ff., PES-G, III, p. 77ff.) is skew to his three-way division between types of mental phenomena. In external perceiving one sees, hears, or otherwise senses a sensory object – something which is colored, a tone, or something warm (PES-E, p. 9, PES-G, I, p. 13). Brentano follows the tradition which says that inner perceivings of such sensings are themselves sensory. Similarly, if such a sensing is the primary object of memory, the latter too is a sensory act. Sensory objects, then, may be either physical or psychological. Presentings are either sensory (intuitions) or conceptual. Brentano mentions that the secondary object of a sensory presenting is called sensory, that of a conceptual presenting noetic (PES-G, III, p. 58). As we shall see, some but not all emotional episodes are sensory.

Similarly, some judgings, both acceptings and denyings (SNC, pp. 57ff., PES, III, pp. 79ff.), are sensory. For all intuitive presentings involve blind judging. Brentano sometimes speaks of blind judgings or certainties as judgings which are the result of a blind instinct. But, as Kraus (PES-G, III, p. 140 n. 21) points out, this is a merely genetic characterization of such judgings. It is therefore preferable to say, with Marty, that every sensing is originally and indissolubly connected with the acceptance of what is sensed . . . [T]he child takes to be true whatever appears to him, instinctively and as a result of innate necessity. Closer considerations show that this instinctive belief is simply inseparable from sensation. This . . . sensory belief, on which . . . immediate belief in the external world rests, is so to speak suspended by the higher cognitive activities but is ineradicable. It is not a superposed act for one-sided separability belongs to the concept of superposition. Rather, sensing is an act which contains two mutually inseparable parts, the intuition of the physical phenomenon and assertoric accepting thereof.20
But if Marty is right, a cardinal principle of Brentano’s descriptive psychology, that every presenting of an object is independent of every judging of the same object, is wrong. Non-intuitive, conceptual presentings of an object, it is true, are independent of judgings of the same object. But a sensory presenting of an object is not independent of a judging of the same object.

To imagine is to enjoy presentings which are not the bases of judgings. What is the difference between seeing a man and imagining a man? Sensations and phantasy presentations differ, Brentano thinks, in that they have different objects, although their objects may seem to be the same. Most phantasy presentations are not intuitive but conceptual presentings with an intuitive kernel (GA, pp. 82, 83). In speaking of conceptual presentings, whether or not these are parts of judgings, Brentano often speaks of presentations of noetic objects, of concepts (PES-G, III, p. 59). But this is misleading since he does not actually think that there are concepts. It would be better to say that when we have conceptual presentations we think or operate with concepts.

Within and at the level of presentational activity we find the operation of identification – “we are able to connect the most disparate objects by way of identifications” without the intervention of any judging. Judging intervenes, however, when we compare and distinguish (PES-E, pp. 282–3, PES-G, II, pp. 146–7). In this context Brentano distinguishes between the object of a presenting and the way it is presented, its content (LRU, p. 47, ANR, p. 218) But this distinction is not prominent in his thought.

Presentings are either direct or indirect, in modo recto or in modo obliquo and thus there are different modes of presentation. Indirect presentings depend unilaterally on direct presentings; they occur whenever what is presented is presented as related to the object of a direct presenting. Thus one may directly present flowers and indirectly present a flower-lover who wants these flowers. To the different types of relations (relations of magnitude, causal relations, the relation between a boundary and what it bounds) and relation-like phenomena (the different intentional “relations”) there correspond different types of indirect presentings. 21

One basic type of sensory presenting is, as we have seen, sensing. How many senses and types of sensing are there? Although his contemporaries were already in the habit of multiplying the senses,
Brentano came to think that there are exactly three senses. The descriptive psychologist should individuate senses by reference to their objects, the sensory qualities. (If the objects of sensing do not belong to the antecedents of sensing, then this way of proceeding is open to the descriptive psychologist.) To all such qualities we apply the distinction between light and dark. Where the opposition applies in the same way we have one sense. There are three analogous applications of the opposition and within each family all the applications are univocal. In addition to the sense for colours and the sense for tones there is one other unified sense which comprehends all the so-called lower senses: the senses of touch, taste, temperature and smell.22

Mind, language, and society

Descriptive psychology is the foundation of genetic psychology on which depend not only logic, ethics, and aesthetics but also economics, politics, and sociology (DP-E, p. 78, DP-G, p. 76). How do we get from the mind to social, linguistic, and cultural facts? How does the mental activity studied by descriptive and genetic psychology produce complex social, legal, cultural, and linguistic structures? Brentano’s answer resembles that given by Adam Ferguson and other Scottish philosophers.23 He compares the emergence of the Roman legal system to that of a natural language; a “sort of natural selection” leads from weak, almost structureless beginnings to the highest types of formation. The law of habit stands in for Darwin’s law of inheritance and, since it involves not merely a tendency to preserve and multiply what is similar but also a tendency to produce what is analogous, does so with considerably greater perfection. (ZF, p. 58)

The expression “natural selection” should not make us overlook the fact that in the emergence of language or of a legal system choices are always being made. Should we therefore suppose that some mind oversees the emergence of language, law, or states? Or is it enough to assume that “the felt damage connected with every unsuitable disposition functioned as a powerful regulator?” (ZF, p. 58):

[W]e must imagine the process leading up to the coming into being of the state as very gradual. To be sure, each step towards it requires mental activity, but none of the innumerable participants had a picture of the eventual
result . . . Perhaps an analogy will clarify the process: the analogy with the gradual evolution of speech . . . Speech evolved gradually, and innumerable people contributed to its construction, yet here again they did not do it as builders work on a building for which there has all along been a plan. No one had the final product in mind. Each person involved was thinking only of the next step, viz. how he and another man could attain understanding in a concrete case. (FCE, p. 366, GAE, pp. 399–400)

**TIME-CONSCIOUSNESS**

Brentano’s thoughts about time-consciousness in presentations of physical phenomena went through at least four stages. The first account was developed in lectures at Würzburg between 1868 and 1870. “A person who affirms something as past or future,” runs Marty’s summary of Brentano’s lectures, “affirms the same matter but the type of affirmation is in each case different.” But Brentano’s assumption that present, past, and future are three discrete types of judgment had as a consequence, he thought, that time cannot be a continuum. His second account of time-consciousness, developed between 1870 and 1894, therefore locates time-consciousness within the matter of presentations. Marty summarizes the view as follows:

If you have a presentation of this pencil that I am now moving around in a circle, you do not merely have a presentation of it as at a point (for then you would have a presentation of it at rest), rather you have a presentation of it as being situated at different points on its path, but not as simultaneously so situated (for then your presentation would be of a body as long as the stretch through which the pencil moves) but rather you have a presentation of it as having been at various points on the stretch longer and longer ago. And, to be sure, that the body was there longer and longer ago is something that is, in a peculiar way, intuitively present to you. This intuition is a thing pertaining to a peculiar activity of the imagination (Phantasie), but not an activity of the imagination in the usual sense of the word, for the latter is not really original, but is productive only through experiences and acquired dispositions; in the presentation of the past, on the other hand, we have something that is absolutely new, for which there is no analogue whatsoever in experience . . . Brentano therefore called this activity of the imagination original association in contrast to acquired association.

This innate original association Brentano calls “proteraesthesis.” Now Marty’s account of Brentano’s analysis is only a first
approximation. Brentano does not think that a moving pencil can be the object of a sensory presentation for it is not a physical phenomenon [which, for Brentano, as we have noted, are colours, sounds, and their ilk]. Furthermore, Marty’s account here leaves open the question what the object of a presentation of that object as past might be. Brentano seems to have thought at this stage that the attribute of being past is an absolute attribute of a physical phenomenon. It is a temporal determination of, for example, a tone (PES-E, p. 135, PES-G, p. 190). Since intuitive presentations are always of what has or belongs to the same temporal types and since the real temporal types change continuously, what it is for a physical phenomenon to be present and what it is for an event which lies behind the veil of appearances to be present must be two very different things. For the scientific hypothesis of the real world which is to explain the succession of physical phenomena is the hypothesis of a world which develops in a direction Brentano calls time-like (zeitähnlich).27

Around 1894 Brentano locates time-consciousness once again in modes of judging but allows the temporal modi to form a continuum.28 In 1905 and 1911 Brentano formulates his fourth account of time-consciousness. He locates it once again in presentations but not, as before, in their objects. Rather, he now thinks, every presentation has a temporal mode and such modes are always modes of presentation.29 One reason Brentano gives for rejecting the view that the primary objects of presentations have temporal determinations is that it is as big a mistake to think that past and present are differences of objects as it is to think that existence and non-existence are real attributes. He formulates his fourth account of time-consciousness as follows:

If we hear a series of sounds . . . the same sound . . . appears to us first as present, then more and more as past, while new things appear as present whose presentation then undergoes the same modal alteration. (PES-E, p. 279, PES-G, II, p. 143)

The predicate “– appears as present” is too close for comfort to the locution used by Marty to describe time-consciousness as bearing on the objects of presentation (“an object is presented as past”). Brentano’s new analysis is perhaps best formulated by saying that the objects of presentations are presented-past, presented-present or presented-future.
One consequence of the fourth view, which Brentano embraces, is that our only awareness of differences in temporal modes of presentation is in inner perceiving.\textsuperscript{31}

What is the structure of these presentings in which objects are presented-past and presented-present? Toward the end of his life Brentano claimed that this structure is a special case of the type of structure, introduced above, which is peculiar to those complex presentings in which indirect presentings depend on direct presentings. “Every temporal past-mode or future-mode belongs . . . to the oblique modes.”\textsuperscript{32} A presenting in a future mode or a presenting in a past mode depends on a direct presenting in a present mode:

If we say of something that it was a year ago, then we do not in the proper sense accept the event, we accept rather presently existing things as existing one year later than it, and then we may also say that we acknowledge the event as having been a year ago. When something is presented as past or as future it is therefore a matter of its being presented not \textit{in modo recto} but \textit{in modo obliquo}. And everything that holds in general of something presented \textit{in modo obliquo} holds therefore of it, too. (STC, pp. 131–2, RZK, p. 156)

The admission of different indirect modes of presentations and thus of complex modes of indirect-cum-direct presentation and, in particular, the introduction of indirect temporal modes of presentation mean that there are more ways of being psychically related than the three originally envisaged by Brentano. Indeed the “continuous manifold” of temporal modes of presenting infects and so multiplies the modes of judging and of the movements of the heart built on these presentings \{PES-E, p. 328, PES-G, II, p. 222\}. Nevertheless, he points out in 1909, his original three-fold division retains its “preeminent import” because there is no psychic relation to an object without one or more of these three ways of being related and because it is always possible by introducing fictions to treat all our psychological activities as belonging to one of the three basic classes.\textsuperscript{33}

Brentano’s account of time-consciousness is an account of what he takes to be the ground-floor of the mind. The combination of direct and indirect presentings he appeals to there is also prominent in his account of the first-floor of the mind, our awareness of space, sensory qualities and the spatial centre of of sensory fields in sensory
perception. To visually perceive colored regions is to enjoy a direct presenting of a spatial point and an indirect presenting of a colored object “as something from which this point stands apart in a certain direction and to a certain extent” (STC, p. 166, RZK, p. 198; cf STC, p. 97, RZK, p. 117).

EMOTIONS

In his *Psychology*, Brentano notes that language suggests that certain emotions relate to objects – we say we are sad or upset about this or that. In such cases emotions “relate to what is presented in” the presentation they are based on [PES-E, p. 90, PES-G, p. 126]. In other words, the intentionality of emotions is inherited from that of their bases, presentations and, in some cases, judgings. Thus remorse, pain, and fear differ in virtue of the temporal modes of their underlying presentations, and positive emotions based on the presenting of some future good fortune will vary as this good fortune is judged to be certain, uncertain, or probable. Because emotions depend unilaterally on presentings and judgings we can conceive of a creature which enjoys presentations and judgments but no emotions [PES-E, p. 267, PES-G, II, p. 128].

Brentano also says that every movement of the heart (*Gemütsbewegung*), or emotion, is a mental phenomenon and gives as examples: joy, sorrow, fear, hope, courage, despair, anger, love, hate, desire, act of will, intention, astonishment, admiration, contempt [PES-E, p. 78, PES-G, I, p. 112]. There are differences between these phenomena, in particular between, say, sadness, and acts of the will but these differences are not as great as the differences between what Brentano calls the class of emotions, on the one hand, and all other psychic phenomena, or between presentation and judgment [PES-E, pp. 235–8, PES-G, II, pp. 83–6].

The class of emotions is unified by a character they all display in their directedness toward objects. In every case there is an accepting or rejecting. Such emotional accepting or rejecting is analogous to the two modes of judging, accepting and rejecting. And Brentano argues that someone who emotionally accepts [rejects] something will, because of this, accept judgmentally its goodness [badness] or value [disvalue]. Indeed he thinks that emotionally accepting, attributing
value, and value are related to one another in much the same way in which judgmental accepting, attributions of truth, and truth are related to each other.\textsuperscript{36}

Not only is every affective phenomenon a case of emotional accepting or rejecting, it is also a case of loving or hating – a claim Brentano thinks ordinary language just about allows him to make (PES-E, p. 246, PES-G, II, p. 98).

Members of the class of emotions differ from one another with respect to the way they relate to their objects, with respect to the presentations and judgments they are based on, and in their strength. A further difference, as we have already seen, is that between loving or hating something for its own sake and loving or hating something for the sake of something else (KRW, p. 144, USE, p. 149). Emotions also differ by having a distinctive hue or coloration (\textit{Färbung}). The existence of such qualitative differences sets limits to how much can be communicated by definitions in this area. But Brentano has great faith in the project of defining the different emotions by reference to their underlying bases, provided the definitions take into account the different oppositions between affective phenomena and differences of strength.\textsuperscript{37} The existence of qualitative differences amongst emotions also entails that there are differences in the way qualitatively different emotions relate to their objects, differences which do not affect the claim that such ways have a common character (PES-E, pp. 250ff., PES-G, II, pp. 104ff.).

Oppositions, Brentano says, “pervade” the class of emotions (PES-G, II, p. 102, PES-E, p. 248). He mentions joy and sorrow, hope and fear, desire and aversion, and willing and not-willing.\textsuperscript{38} In a note Kraus says that not-willing, “Nichtwollen,” “is not to be understood as the negation of willing but as a willing that something not exist” (PES-G, II, p. 290 n. 8). Certainly, Brentano is not here distinguishing between willing and not-willing. But if willing is to enjoy the polarity which pervades the class of emotions then, in referring to not-willing, Brentano must have in mind a psychological phenomenon with its own conative coloring. If Kraus’s interpretation were correct the distinction between willing and not-willing would be a distinction of content. What Brentano has in mind is, rather, a distinction between conative pro and contra attitudes, for example, striving for and striving against, or shunning, between willing for and willing against (as his English translator says) and not a distinction between
contents. This distinction resembles the one he makes between desire and aversion.  

Preferring

All the examples of emotions mentioned so far may occur as relations between a subject and the object of his emotion. But in the Psychology Brentano mentions a phenomenon which always relates a subject and two objects – “I can say that I love one thing more than I hate another” (PES-E, p. 252, PES-G, II, p. 107). This is the phenomenon he came to call preferring (Vorziehen, Bevorzugen). Preferring, unlike “simple loving,” is relational; there is simple and relative loving. Preferrings may themselves be the objects of a preferring (KRW, pp. 143ff., USE, pp. 148ff.). So may other emotions – we prefer joy to sadness (KRW, pp. 20ff., USE, pp. 21ff.). One of his more important claims is that simple loving and “preferring which does not turn into genuine wishing” hold of their objects “in a certain abstraction from circumstances.” Wishing and wanting, by contrast, take such circumstances into account (KRW, p. 151, USE, p. 157). Preferring is a much more fundamental phenomenon than willing, deciding, and choosing because the objects of preferrings may lie outside our powers (FCE, p. 200, GAE, p. 218). A related distinction which Brentano sometimes makes is that between preferrings in general and “practical preferrings, that is, acts of choice” where “choosing is preferential willing.”

Brentano seems to have changed his mind about the emotions as a result of asking himself two questions: What is the relation between pain and love? Do emotions vary in strength? These two problems are aspects of the question whether, and in what sense, higher, “spiritual” emotions differ from lower, sensory or vital emotions.

Affects

The unified family of affective and conative phenomena is a family of what Brentano often calls “geistige” or spiritual phenomena or acts. These are not sensory phenomena. There seems, then, to be no place for sensory pleasure and pain. Furthermore, one very common assumption about such pains and pleasures makes them out to be psychological phenomena which have no objects, which are not
intentional. This is incompatible with Brentano’s view that to be psychological is to be intentional.

Brentano’s first attempt to deal with these problems is to be found in his *Psychology*. Each emotion is based on presentations. It is tempting to think that “the lowest feelings (Gefühle) of pleasure and pain” do not belong to the same category as joy, sorrow, fear, etc. because they seem to be based on no presentations. But appearances are deceptive. When pain or pleasure are caused in us by tickling, burns, or cuts we have, Brentano argues, feelings based on a presentation of a physical phenomenon with a spatial determination and the object of the feeling is the object of the presentation. We are misled by the fact that we call the physical phenomenon which occurs with the pain-feeling a pain, as when we say we feel pain in one leg. But not every pain or pleasure has as its object a physical phenomenon. If I “hear a harmonious sound, the pleasure which I feel is not actually pleasure in the sound but pleasure in the hearing.” This last claim illustrates what Brentano’s heirs like to call “Funktionsfreude,” joy or pleasure in activity rather than in an external object. The claim itself will be rejected by Brentano, although it contains the basic idea of his subsequent thoughts on higher and lower emotions.

Brentano’s second attempt to deal with the relation between higher and lower affective phenomena is to be found in a theory set out in 1907. The new theory makes use of Brentano’s new account of sensing. “Sensory pleasure (*Lust*) and spiritual agreeableness (*Wohlgefallen*), sensory pain and spiritual disagreeableness” do indeed have a “common character”:

sensory pleasure is an agreeing, sensory pain a disagreeing, which are directed towards a sensory act to which they themselves belong. (USP, p. 237)

Brentano’s sensory pleasures and pains consist of an act of sensing and a spiritual attitude toward this sensing. To feel pain is to sense and to hate this sensing. But what sort of sensing is involved in pain? What is its object? And how exactly are the sensing and the being disagreeable or hating thereof related?

As we have already seen, Brentano thinks there are exactly three types of sensing. The sensing peculiar to pain is sensing of the third kind, its objects are tactile, taste and temperature qualities. Sensing has both:
a primary and a secondary object. The first is something which is sensory and qualitative, the second is the act of sensing itself which always relates to itself via a presenting and in a self-evident judgement of accepting, and which sometimes relates to itself emotionally. This last case occurs in sensory pleasure and pain and makes the relevant sensing acts, as true affects, differ from other other sensing acts. (USP, p. 237)

Thus once again Brentano is relying on the idea that an act can have itself as an object in many different ways. Brentano rejects two common views:

Not only are pleasure and pain not sensory qualities, they are not psychological relations which would have sensory qualities as objects in modo recto. (SNC, p. 59, PES-G, III, p. 80)

If pain were a sensory quality which we sense, then, given Brentano’s view that it does not follow from my sensing a physical phenomenon such as a color that there is a color I see, we should expect that my sensing a pain does not entail that there is a pain. This would be an unwelcome result for Brentano since he believes that “we grasp the real existence of pleasure and pain with immediate certainty” (SNC, pp. 16, 59, PES-G, III, pp. 21, 80). But, as we have seen, the sensing of the third kind which is essential to pain is presented and accepted with self-evidence, as is also, we may add, this sensing and the spiritual anti-attitude toward it.

Brentano’s new account of what it is to have a pain in one leg, then, fits and uses many of his main claims about the mind. But what is involved in having a pain in one leg? As we might by now expect, Brentano says that a sensing which finds itself to be spiritually disagreeable has as its direct object, sensory qualities, and as its indirect object, spatial determinations (SNC, p. 59, PES-G, III, p. 81).

Is it true that sensory pleasure and pain involve only sensing of the third kind? Brentano points out that he had not made this restriction in his Psychology (USP, p. 239), indeed, as we have seen, he there claims that there is a pleasure in hearing, and the restriction may seem to be obviously false. As Brentano points out, it seems to be incompatible with the facts of enjoyment of music and paintings, not to mention the reaction of the bull to a red cloth. But, he argues at length:
sensations with an emotional character are not given in seeing and hearing themselves but in co-sensations ([Mitempfindungen]) which regularly accompany seeing and hearing in normal cases. (USP, p. 100)

The ability to hear is one thing, the ability of the man who has a musical ear a very different thing [cf. USP, pp. 235ff.]. Sensings of the third kind, for example of tactile qualities, which are agreeable or disagreeable may be produced by seeing and hearing. Only in this way do seeings and hearings yield sensory pleasure and pain. But they may, of course, also be the basis for non-sensory pro- and contra-attitudes simply in virtue of their objects. On occasions, Brentano seems also to allow that conceptual activity itself, rather than its objects, may be the objects of non-sensory emotions and he certainly thinks that conceptual activity directed to external objects – good news – can produce agreeable and disagreeable sensings of the third kind. In all these cases, tremblings and other ways of being literally moved, of resonating, are effected. We should, Brentano says, recognize in such “sensory redoundings” “one of the most wonderful teleological features of the order of our psychic life” (KRW, pp. 156–7, USE, pp. 163–4).

**Preferrings and emotional intensity**

In his *Psychology* Brentano thinks that the relation I may stand in of hating one object more than some other object should be understood in terms of differences of intensity between my simple affective attitudes to these objects. This view, Brentano came to think, is wrong. “More” does not refer to a relation between the intensities of two acts. But he continues to speak of preferring as a type of comparison (KRW, p. 143, USE, p. 148).

**THE SELF**

Are you, the reader of this sentence, simple or complex? Are you one or many?

You are now visually perceiving physical phenomena and so are aware of your visual perception and you are probably also grasping certain thoughts with interest or boredom and hearing physical phenomena. So you are not, Brentano thinks, simple. Might it be the
case that each of the mental phenomena just mentioned belongs to three or four different yous? No. The interest or boredom just mentioned depends on the thinking just mentioned. If each had a different bearer, then the interest or boredom would not depend on the thinking mentioned. Similarly, only the unique bearer of the visual and the auditive perception can compare these, note that that these are numerically distinct phenomena. Thus you are, Brentano thinks, one, complex thing or real unity, and it is your inner perception which reveals to you that this is the case. He also says, rather puzzlingly, that you are, like the mental phenomena mentioned, a psychological phenomenon. The real unity you are at the moment the three phenomena occur does not contain past psychic phenomena. In his *Psychology* he leaves open the question whether the continued existence of the self is the enduring of one and the same unified thing or a succession of different things.\(^{45}\)

The claim that your psychological acts at a time present themselves to you as a unity which is not the unity of a bundle (PES-E, pp. 96–7, PES-G, I, pp. 135–6) but that of a “unified whole” (PES-E, p. 155, PES-G, I, p. 221) was one Brentano continued to endorse though his arguments in favor of this “unity of consciousness” and his understanding of this unity changed.\(^{46}\)

You, the reader, knew all along that you are exactly one thing and not two, or three. And Brentano agrees with you. In perceiving physical phenomena produced by the words you are reading you innerly perceive the identity of the inner perceiver and the seer you are: “nothing can be perceived as merely factual with immediate self-evidence which is not identical with the perceiver . . . [No] individual can perceive more than one individual with immediate self-evidence, and this is his self.”\(^{47}\) This might suggest that you know who you are, which thing you are. But, according to Brentano, you do not know which thing you are. Your inner perception reveals that you are exactly one substance but not which substance. It does not, we might say, reveal who you are. If each of us is a man, a substance, with many psychological properties, what makes each such substance the individual man he is is not revealed in inner perception:

If we recognize, however, that in this case [we have a sensory inner perception of ourselves as seeing and hearing beings] we have only a single thing as object, then this also shows that we perceive that thing only in general,
because we can, without contradiction, imagine that another being has the very same determination as the being that we perceive. Thus someone else could have the same visual presentations, the same sensory judgements and sensory affects. So these things do not constitute the individuality of that which we inwardly perceive.\textsuperscript{48}

All presentings, conceptual or not, Brentano came to think,\textsuperscript{49} are general, all “determinations” are “universal” and so presentings do not present us with anything “as individualized” although, as we have seen, they can present us with exactly one object.\textsuperscript{50} Since not all general presentations are conceptual, we should not say that Brentano thinks that all presentation is descriptive. But since he thinks that all types of access to selves are general and shareable, we may attribute to him the view that such access has a public dimension. Its private dimension is due to the fact that you cannot perceive any object other than yourself with immediate self-evidence.

In 1874, Brentano’s theory that a self at a moment is a unified whole rather than a mere collective was part of his metaphysical theory that a collective is not a substance or thing. He later came to accept that a collective is a thing or substance.\textsuperscript{51} It is in his metaphysics also that we find his arguments to show that that “in us which thinks” – that is, sees, hears, judges, loves, desires, etc. – “is not anything material (\textit{Körperliches}) and must be assumed to be spiritual” [EG, §436, DG, p. 428, cf. STC, p. 92, RZK, p. 111; contrast TC, p. 119, KL, p. 158]. For, as we have seen, Brentano does not think that inner perception can help us in this connection. It neither reveals mental phenomena to be spatial nor reveals them to be non-spatial.

\textbf{THE AFTERMATH}

The Brentano-effect, inside and outside philosophy, was so great that it is still difficult to appreciate its proportions.\textsuperscript{52} A brief look at some of the reactions, witting and unwitting, to claims of Brentano may help to bring these into sharper focus. We may distinguish, first of all, between philosophers who share Brentano’s theoretical ambitions for a philosophy of mind and those who reject these.

Some three-quarters of a century after the publication of Brentano’s \textit{Psychology} another extraordinarily influential Austrian account of the mind, Wittgenstein’s \textit{Philosophical Investigations},
also referred to the apparent immaturity of psychology and the combination of experimental methods and conceptual confusions which characterize it. But, although Wittgenstein, too, attaches great importance to description (to “seeing” the details) and to its priority with respect to explanation and theories, he did not conclude that empirical or experimental psychology required a grounding in a thoroughly theoretical philosophy of mind. It is, nevertheless, a striking fact that many of the views criticized by Wittgenstein and also many of the views he espoused are to be found in the writings of Brentano and his heirs (and hardly anywhere else): endorsement and rejection – of the view that there are private mental objects, of the view that internal relations are normative, of the view that seeing and seeing-as are concept-free, of the view that there are true, synthetic a priori propositions, of the views that there are “spiritual” acts of meaning and ideal propositions, of the view that words are fundamentally tools, of the view that justification may be defeasible and non-inductive, of the view that the traditional questions of epistemology undergo a drastic change of aspect once the pervasive phenomenon of primitive certainty is recognized.

Of the twentieth century philosophers who shared Brentano’s ambitions for a purely theoretical philosophy of mind, his pupils and heirs modified Brentano’s analyses almost beyond recognition, whereas more recent philosophers have returned to central claims of Brentano.

The intense discussions of Brentano’s anatomy of the mind by his pupils and heirs led to modifications and revisions which mainly concerned Brentano’s taxonomic claims and, to a lesser extent, his views about the type of analytic framework suitable for analyzing the mind (as opposed to its objects). Brentano’s views that time-consciousness is the ground-floor of the mind and emotions its top-floor were both taken over by his heirs but extensively modified.

Perhaps the major source of the revisions was the endorsement by so many of Brentano’s scions of three types of object never countenanced, except in passing, by Brentano: states of affairs (Husserl, Meinong), understood as wholly distinct from the propositional contents representing them, Gestalt-qualities (Ehrenfels) and mind-independent values (Husserl, Meinong, Scheler). Since Brentano’s students agreed with him that fundamental differences in objects have consequences for the analysis of the acts of which they are
the objects, they were led to new analyses of such acts. In particular, to introduce the category of propositional attitudes – a category at the centre of the writings of Bolzano and Frege – under which they brought not merely judging and belief but many other “acts” and attitudes. Thus Ehrenfels and Meinong rejected the thesis that emotions and the will belong on the same continuum because it is incompatible with the fact that although some emotions have things as their objects, to will or desire is to will or desire that some existential state of affairs obtains. Husserl put forward what has become a more popular view: to will or desire is to will or desire that some state of affairs, existential or not, obtains. Similarly, Husserl’s view that to see is sometimes to see a thing or a process and sometimes to see that a state of affairs obtains amounts to a substantial revision of Brentano’s analysis of seeing, not just because it introduces propositional seeing but because it endorses naive realism about visual perception. Stumpf’s influential distinction between functions and acts extends Brentano’s distinction between sensory and noetic phenomena but also upsets it by introducing the distinction between propositional and non-propositional acts.

Brentano’s emotions have as objects the purely natural objects represented by their cognitive bases and value is understood as a feature of a relation between emotions. Husserl, Meinong and many others came round to the view that emotions directly present mind-independent values of which natural entities are the bearers. Other notable revisions are the arguments of Geiger and Scheler that affective phenomena, both episodes and enduring non-dispositional sentiments, may be unconscious;53 the rejection, by the early Husserl and Scheler, of the view that inner perception is infallible; the rejection by Stumpf and Husserl of the view that all psychological phenomena are intentional.

Other objections concern important details: Ehrenfels denies that love in the narrow sense of the word, personal love, is any sort of episode; it is, rather, a disposition. Geiger denies that opposition is as pervasive in the affective sphere as Brentano seems to have thought, enjoyment (Genuss), he argues, has no opposite.

Brentano, like the grandfather of Austrian philosophy, Bolzano, produced a large number of analyses, logical and psychological. As we have noted, in Brentano’s case, there is sometimes a surprising difference between analysandum and analysans. Thus Brentano tells us that propositions which seem to be about psychological episodes
are really about thinkers and about nothing else and that pains are not the non-intentional states they seem to be. This feature of his analyses seems to have led the phenomenologists to distrust analyses which depart very far from appearances.

Although Brentano’s structural frameworks, his assumptions about accidents and modal mereology, survive in different forms in the works of his followers, one aspect thereof was to be thoroughly revised. As we have seen, Brentano thinks of a person’s psychological complexity at a time as an onion: a hating may be built on a judging which is built on a presenting. One exception to the onion structure is provided by the relation between, say, a presenting of a physical phenomenon and the inner perceiving of this presenting. Here we have something like a relation of reciprocal dependence. Relations of reciprocal dependence play a central role in the philosophies of mind of Husserl, Meinong, and their heirs. Husserl, for example, argues that every token propositional content must be associated with a “mode” which is either a judging or a supposing and that each of these modes requires some propositional content.

This revision of Brentano’s framework is intimately connected with what is, together with the introduction of propositional attitudes, the most important revision of Brentano’s taxonomy. According to Meinong, there corresponds to every type of “serious” act a non-serious counterpart, a determinate type of imagining or phantasy. Thus to seeing, judging and hating there correspond make-believe seeing, make-believe judging (supposing) and make-believe hating. Husserl and Witasek defend less ambitious versions and variants of the same thesis.

One intriguing feature of the development of descriptive psychology is the way in which theses endorsed early and then rejected by Brentano come to be adopted by his heirs. Thus Scheler revives the doctrine of an inner sense and Brentano’s view that in a psychological phenomenon of any type all the other types are co-instantiated. Husserl’s oh so appropriately baptized doctrine of the noetic–noematic correlation is structurally similar to Brentano’s first account of intentionality. Many of Brentano’s heirs, including the early Husserl, rejected his view of the self. But Husserl came to endorse an egology and was followed in this by his many pupils.

Through all the more or less radical transformations of Brentano’s analyses of the mind, the vivisections of Husserl, Pfänder, and Scheler, still unfortunately the most thorough descriptions of the
mind we possess, it is possible, for those with ears to hear, to discern variations on the Austrian melody initially composed by Brentano.

Much recent work on the nature of the philosophy of mind has taken to heart views like those of Brentano rather than those of Wittgenstein. And even Brentano’s specific leads, rather than the modifications of Brentano’s theses due to his pupils and heirs, are once again in favor.

Thus Brentano’s account of mind combines two now popular claims. The mind is representational and its intentionality is *de se*. Every psychological phenomenon represents according to Brentano’s account of inner perception, either itself or something else. Thus Brentano combines the view that there are very many distinct qualia, for example the distinctive hues of different emotions, with representationalism. On his early view, every mental phenomenon contains a representation or presentation of itself. On his later view, every sufferer and lover, for example, is an internal presenter of himself.55

All my external perception and all my conceptual thinking is, Brentano thinks, in the first instance, about me. For all such mental activity contains an inner perceiving by me of myself albeit an inner perceiving which involves no direct acquaintance with myself. So what happens when I think of a stone lying in a street in Peking (the example is Brentano’s – SNC, p. 7, PES-G, III, p. 7)? Somehow the general concepts employed in such a thinking must be combined with my general grasp of myself. How? At least two remarkable contemporary theories of intentionality provide answers to such questions which are compatible with Brentano’s claim that all intentionality is primarily *de se* and secondarily *de re*.56

Nevertheless, were Brentano to cast an eye over contemporary philosophy of mind and cognitive science, although he would doubtless salute its severely theoretical attitude, he would also regret that the task of describing the mind has been taken seriously only by those, such as the heirs of Heidegger and Wittgenstein, who have no theoretical goals.57

**Notes**

2. MWO, pp. 6, 32, 35. Brentano believes the methods of the natural sciences, the human sciences and philosophy resemble each other (ZF, 35ff., 75ff.).


6. See the essay by Charles D. Parsons in this volume.


and 1906 he was apparently tempted by the view that presentings and judgings should be collapsed into one category; see Oskar Kraus, *Franz Brentano. Zur Kenntnis seines Lebens und seiner Lehre* [Munich: Beck, 1919], p. 25, and Brentano's manuscript “Von der Natur der Vorstellung,” edited and prefaced by Johannes Brandl (*Conceptus*, 1987), pp. 25–31.


28. See Brentano’s 1895 letter to Marty in Kraus, “Towards a Phenomenognosy of Time Consciousness,” p. 227. Brentano also defended this view in 1899, see RZK, p. xxviii n. 15.


31. SNC, p. 38, PES-G, III, p. 52; PES-E, II, p. 329, PES-G, II, p. 224; STC, p. 100, RZK, p. 121. Two parts of Brentano’s account of time-consciousness which I have had to omit are: (1) his account of the temporal relations of earlier–later than and simultaneity, the differences of “transcendent time” and our awareness of these, see STC, p. 157 n.1, RZK, p. 186 note; STC, pp. 89–90, RZK, pp. 107–8; (2) his view that although there is, as we have seen, an external protaesthesia, there is no inner protaesthesia, see STC, pp. 87ff., RZK, pp. 105ff.


34. KRW, p. 142, USE, p. 147; DP-E, p. 159, DP-G, p. 150.


37. See, for example, his definitions of willing [PES-E, pp. 248–9, PES-G, II, pp. 103–15, 257; FCE, pp. 200ff., GAE, pp. 218ff.; KRW, pp. 113ff., 150ff, USE, pp. 112ff., 156ff. On these, see Chisholm, *Brentano and Intrinsic Value*, pp. 22ff. On the fact that the way many words for emotions are used lack sharp boundaries, see KRW, p. 152, USE, p. 159.


40. PES-E, pp. 286ff., USE, §30.


49. For his earlier view, cf. VE, p. 33.


52. See Smith and Mulligan, “Pieces of a Theory.”

53. This sort of position is often ascribed to Freud. But Brentano’s erstwhile student in fact wrote: “It is surely of the essence of an emotion that we should feel it, i.e. that it should enter consciousness. So for emotions, feelings and affects to be unconscious would be quite out of the question” (Sigmund Freud, “The Unconscious”, in, ed., E. Jones, *Collected Papers of Sigmund Freud*, vol. IV [New York: Basic Books, 1915]).

54. Brentano accepts the doctrine of an inner sense in 1867 (PA, p. 90) and rejects it in 1874 (PES-G, I, pp. 176ff.).
55. For recent versions of the view that mental phenomena are representational through and through, see Michael Tye, *Ten Problems of Consciousness* (Boston, MA: MIT Press/Bradford Books, 2000).


57. Thanks, for their comments, to Johannes Brandl and Barry Smith.