ANALYZING MIDDLE EAST FOREIGN POLICIES
AND THE RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE

At a time when the Middle East and North Africa – host to most of the world’s oil and gas reserves – are often identified with threats of instability, ‘rogue states,’ terrorism and migration, Europe has its own particular concerns about the region that sits on its doorstep. Yet a genuine understanding of what drives the behaviour of these states remains elusive.

This book provides a conceptual framework for the analysis of Middle Eastern foreign policies in general, and for understanding these states’ relations with Europe in particular. It examines the domestic, regional and international environments that condition these policies, and investigates the actual policy output through a wide range of country studies drawn from the Maghreb, the Mashreq, the Gulf and Turkey. Europe is treated here both as a target of these foreign policies, and as part of the environment that shapes them.

This south-to-north perspective, using the tools of Foreign Policy Analysis, fills a major gap in the literature on Euro-Middle Eastern relations. It also adds to the study of International Relations by throwing light on wider questions about ‘Third World’ foreign policy.

This book is an extensively revised, expanded and updated version of a special issue of The Review of International Affairs.

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Introduction

GERD NONNEMAN

This study is the outcome of a two-year project, sponsored by the Mediterranean Program of the European University Institute’s Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, which aimed to bring a new perspective to the study both of Middle Eastern–European relations and of Foreign Policy Analysis of developing states – hoping to contribute, in order words, both to the discipline of International Relations and to Middle East Area Studies. The ‘Middle East’ is used here as encompassing the Arab world plus Iran, Turkey and Israel (although Israeli policy itself is not part of our enquiry, as it is not a developing state, features quite different dynamics, and has, in any case, received considerably more attention already). An alternative label spells out the inclusion of the Maghreb by specifying the region of interest as ‘The Middle East and North Africa’, or ‘MENA’ region – the latter acronym having become familiar in a number of policy fora and initiatives.

While Euro-Arab and Euro-Middle Eastern relations have received a fair degree of academic attention over the past decade, most of this attention has taken one or more of five forms:

1. Overviews of a presumed Mediterranean system – whether as a security complex, or as a merely geographically defined theatre within which economic and security interests are played out.¹
2. Studies of Europe’s interests in the MENA region.
3. Reviews of European policy.²
4. Policy recommendations for Europe.
5. Explorations of the causes of cultural misunderstanding.

Amid all this, an obvious lens through which to view one half of the equation has been left strikingly underused: namely, Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) focusing on the determinants of the foreign policies of the MENA states themselves – which would allow the South-to-North perspective to be placed in its proper context.

This reflects a similar bias in the study of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis: by and large, ‘North–South relations’ have been studied in a fashion that reflects the ordering of those labels more generally – either because, in most cases, the focus was on the policies and interests of the ‘Northern’ end of the equation; or, from a more critical perspective, because of an assumption that the key determinant was the straightjacket of Northern-imposed dependency within which Southern states have found themselves. It is hoped that the analytical framework suggested in the editor’s own contribution – honed through discussion with the other members of the group – together with the case
studies that follow it, may help enrich the theoretical debate on the context and
determinants of the foreign policies of states of the South – or indeed the
multifarious category of ‘small’ states.

Nine of the 13 contributions to this volume began as papers presented in a
workshop on ‘The Determinants of Middle Eastern and North African States’
Foreign Policies: with Special Reference to their Relations with Europe’,
directed by the editor, at the Third Mediterranean Social and Political Research
Meeting, Florence and Montecatini Terme, March 20–24, 2002, which was
organized by the Mediterranean Program of the Robert Schuman Centre for
Advanced Studies at the European University Institute. The workshop
participants were selected on the basis of a large number of responses to an
international call for papers, based on an early version of the editor’s
‘Framework for Analysis’ (which became the first two chapters in this study).
Intensive discussion at the workshop was followed up over the following year,
and all contributions which were eventually selected for inclusion in this study
were substantially rewritten. In addition, two further contributions, on Egypt and
Morocco, were brought in shortly after the workshop; these authors, too, became
integral members of the project and based their work on a consideration of the
framework put forward.

This book was developed from a Special Issue of the journal Review of
International Affairs, which included a book reviews section. While the latter has
no place in the book, a review article by Raymond Hinnebusch that appeared in
the Special Issue (‘Identity in International Relations: Constructivism versus
Materialism and the Case of the Middle East’) was felt to be of such importance
in deepening the exploration of some conceptual issues introduced in the volume,
that the author was asked, and gracefully agreed, to turn this paper into a proper
final chapter for the purpose of the book. The first chapter was significantly
amended for the book version, to bring greater clarity and comprehensiveness to
the conceptual framework, hopefully furthering more effectively our aim of
integrating the study of International Relations (IR) with that of the Middle East.
The second chapter was extensively updated. Minor corrections were also
introduced in a number of other chapters. In a sense, therefore, the book is
already in its ‘revised and expanded second edition’ from the start.

The common starting framework and subsequent exchange and coordination,
however, did not mean that the contributors were wholly constrained: where
variations on, departures from, or even clear disagreements with the original
framework were judged appropriate, either in conceptual terms or because
authors felt particular emphases and formats of presentation better brought out
the salient points of their argument, this was encouraged. We hope the reader
will agree the result is all the more enriching for it.

The first chapter suggests an analytical framework for studying the foreign
policies of MENA states both in general and with special reference to their
relations with Europe. It argues for an approach to studying MENA states’
foreign policy that is rooted in an eclectic (or ‘theoretically pluralist’) ‘complex
model of international politics’. Explanations in Foreign Policy Analysis, it is
argued, must be multi-level and multi-causal, as well as contextual.
The levels on which MENA states’ foreign policy determinants must be examined are domestic, regional, and international. At the *domestic* level, the key categories of determinants are:

1. The nature of the state (secure/insecure, extent of ‘national’ identity consolidation, authoritarian/liberalizing, rentier/non-rentier).
2. The nature and interests of the regime.
3. Capabilities (especially economic and technological).
4. The decision-making system.
5. Decision-makers’ perceptions and role conception.

The *regional* level combines, on the one hand, these states’ immediate strategic environment; and, on the other, the transnational ideological issues of (pan)Arabism and Islam. These latter issues retain some force as a constraint on regimes’ foreign policy behavior, and in some cases as a resource to be deployed in the pursuit of the maintenance of a domestic or regional constituency, against domestic, regional or international threats. But it is suggested that their salience has diminished relative to interests defined within the context of the territorial state, as states and associated identities have become consolidated.

The *international* environment presents a range of resources (economic, military, political) as well as challenges and constraints (threats, dependence). The composition of this environment will vary from state to state, depending among other things on the state’s location. The increasing hold of the ‘globalizing’ trend in economics and politics also changes the environment within which regimes have to make their domestic and foreign policy choices. Europe, and European policy, are part of this international environment.

In ‘omnibalancing’ between the pressures and opportunities in these three environments, foreign policy orientation and behavior has increasingly focused on the pragmatic pursuit of regime and state interests, rather than ideology, especially since the 1970s. These interests are essentially those of regime survival and consolidation, and state consolidation, and the acquisition of the political and economic means to ensure them.

In this pursuit, the chapter argues, the extent of autonomy MENA states have, or can carve out, from ‘core’ actors in the international political economy is greater than dependency thinking has allowed for, because, among other things, there has been competition between core actors themselves, and core powers’ interests tend to lie in different areas and are much more globally scattered than is the case for those of MENA states. This, it is suggested, creates potential room for maneuver for adept leaders. The higher the level of state formation already achieved, the greater the autonomy from domestic pressures, and hence the easier the omnibalancing game and the attendant ‘polygamy’ (or ‘managed multi-dependence’) are likely to become.

The second chapter homes in more specifically on the three environments (domestic, regional, and international) that shape MENA states’ foreign policies. Since Europe, and European policies, are a crucial part of the external environment (regional/international) which contributes to shaping
MENA states’ own policies, not least towards Europe itself, the study also provides a brief overview of the evolution of European policy towards the region and its component parts. It ends with some preliminary conclusions about MENA states’ policies towards Europe. Nine salient features are suggested:

1. They are by and large pragmatic rather than ideological.
2. They are based in the first place on a view of Europe as a source of economic resources and technology.
3. Nevertheless, some constraint continues to be imposed by the Palestine issue and nationalist motifs.
4. Policies are also in some measure based on a view of Europe as a counterweight to the US.
5. There is a residual but strongly varying effect of colonial/imperial relations.
6. MENA states differentiate between European states also because of existing levels of economic links and interests, and because of perceived differences in European states’ foreign policy stances.
7. There are large variations flowing from the nature, needs and location of the MENA state/regime in question – variables that encompass both ‘material’ and ‘ideational’ factors.
8. Two significant irritants are European reluctance genuinely to open up its own market in key sectors, such as agriculture and petrochemicals, and European political pressure over political reform.
9. Finally, MENA policies towards Europe are individual (state) at least as much as collective (Arab/Muslim/Gulf/Maghreb), as a consequence both of the intra-MENA differences listed above, and Europe’s own approach, which has been predominantly bilateral (albeit masked by a wider framework in the case of the Mediterranean).

In subsequent chapters, a range of case studies covering the region from Morocco to Iran engage with this framework in more detail (although, as already indicated, it was left to authors’ judgement how explicit this should be made – or indeed whether they wished to diverge from it – to achieve the most effective analysis). The cases of Morocco (Michael Willis and Nizar Messari), Egypt (Emad Gad), Syria (Raymond Hinnebusch), Lebanon (Tom Pierre Najem), the states of the Gulf Cooperation Council (Abdulla Baabood), Iran (Ziba Moshaver) and Turkey (Mustafa Aydın) are examined systematically, drawing attention to the specificities of each while also allowing the reader to discover the parallels. With Iraq in post-Saddam flux, any treatment of that country’s foreign policy must of necessity be historical; rather than offer a survey of the much-analyzed Saddam era, Alberto Tonini offers a useful historical comparative case, considering the reign of Abdulkarim Qasim, the country’s first republican president, whose foreign policy was driven and constrained by many of the same factors. Paul Aarts and Dennis Janssen examine one illuminating aspect of foreign policy of special importance both to the MENA region and to Europe – viz. the positions taken by key Middle East oil producers.
on the question of climate change, in particular vis-à-vis the European Union. Here, they specifically bring to bear the insights of the constructivist approach in IR – insights which, alongside ‘materialist’ realist and systemic foci, are introduced in the first chapter and also feature implicitly or explicitly throughout much of the text. This wider conceptual debate, and the question of regional specificity versus universal rules in the study of International Relations, is then finally taken up again in a second contribution by Hinnebusch, through a focus on the struggle between regional identity and systemic structure in the Middle East (taking his case material from across the whole region but also contrasting the Jordanian case in particular – not represented among the country chapters – with that of Syria).

We were fortunate in being able to also include an afterword by Sayyid Badr bin Hamad Al Bu Said, Oman’s Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, on the diplomacy of small states. Based on a lecture delivered to Belgium’s Royal Institute for International Affairs, on the occasion of the first formal Omani-Belgian bilateral negotiations in September 2003 not long after the initial version of our project was completed, this presents quite independently a senior practitioner’s view of many of the issues at the heart of this volume. A thoughtful contribution in its own right, both in general and with regard to Oman’s foreign policy, it links with a number of academic debates in the field of international relations, meshing rather strikingly with some of the insights emerging from our project. At the same time, as a view by one well-placed actor in the making and implementation of the very policies under examination, it can serve as a valuable ‘primary source’, illustrating some of the themes explored in the essays that follow.

NOTES
2. The most recent of these is Søren Dosenrode and Anders Stubkjaer, The European Union and the Middle East (London/New York: Sheffield Academic Press, 2002).
Analyzing the Foreign Policies of the Middle East and North Africa: A Conceptual Framework

GERD NONNEMAN

INTRODUCTION

This chapter sets out a suggested framework for looking at Middle Eastern–European relations from the perspective of MENA states’ foreign policies. This adds an important dimension to the usual approach which views those relations as part of a global ‘Mediterranean’ relationship and largely from the perspective of European policy. An obvious lens through which to view one half of the equation has been left strikingly underused, viz. Foreign Policy Analysis (FPA) focusing on the determinants of the foreign policies of the MENA states themselves – which would allow the South-to-North perspective to be placed in its proper context.

This reflects a similar ‘Northern’ bias in the study of International Relations and Foreign Policy Analysis more generally. It can also be explained partly by the predominance of European interests in this academic equation; partly by the relatively less developed Foreign Policy Analysis discipline in the MENA region; and partly by the relative dearth of analytical work on Middle Eastern foreign policies tout court. With the exception of a limited number of case studies, and a few works on the Middle East’s position in the international political economy, there was no recent systematic attempt to study Arab foreign policies until the publication of the collective work directed by Korany and Dessouki in 1984. This was followed only by a second edition of the same work in 1991, and then another contribution on an aspect relating to foreign policy, in the shape of the collective volume on national security in the Arab world edited by Korany, Brynen and Dessouki (1993). Only very recently has there appeared a comparable new contribution on Middle Eastern foreign policies in the shape of an edited volume by Hinnebusch and Ehteshami.

There is a need, then, to develop further the systematic comparative study of Middle Eastern foreign policy(ies) in general, and an even more glaring need to consider Euro-Middle Eastern (or rather, ‘Middle Eastern-European’) relations through that prism. Only thus can one hope to arrive at a genuine understanding of what underlies MENA states’ policy orientations and behavior towards Europe, and therefore how they might develop in the future.
AN APPROACH TO FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS ROOTED IN A COMPLEX MODEL OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

In viewing the relationship instead as one part of the MENA states’ overall foreign policy orientation, this chapter argues for an approach to studying MENA states’ foreign policy that is rooted in an eclectic ‘complex model of international politics’. Explanations in Foreign Policy Analysis, it is argued, must be multi-level and multi-causal, as well as contextual.

The analysis of any country’s foreign policy is necessarily rooted in a number of assumptions. In explaining the dynamics of International Relations (IR), and by extension in the analysis of foreign policy, Realist thinking has focused largely on the ‘power’ impulse and has usually taken states as monolithic actors rationally calculating costs and benefits in a power-balancing game, the rules of which, in the ‘anarchic society’ of world politics, are presumed as given. For neo-realists such as Waltz, it is the international system, rather than the state-level desire for power in its own right, that should be the prime focus of analysis, as its anarchic structure (with different varieties of polarity) drives states to adopt the behavioural patterns of ‘power politics’, in order to ensure survival. Although Waltz admits that changes in the international system itself may result from structural factors within states, he has little or no interest in descending below the system level.5

Other schools, more usually self-defined as part of the ‘Foreign Policy Analysis’ (FPA) discipline, do delve into the inner workings of these states, focusing on decision-making, the bureaucracy, and/or the elites and personalities making policy. So-called ‘neotraditional realism’ from the late 1990s, too, re-focused on the role of leaders’ perceptions and other state-level factors, while retaining the structural insights of neorealism.6

A relatively recent contribution that stands out, as it conceptually links the state and system levels, comes in the shape of the so-called ‘constructivist’ approach (with Wendt as its most prominent figure), which stresses cultural and ideational factors as co-determining both state behaviour and the structure of the international system. For state actors, in the constructivist conception, it is the (socially constructed) meanings of facts and objects they encounter in their domestic and external environments, that inspires their actions. Wendt argues that the state and the structures in which it sits shape each other, as a result of a web of ‘intersubjective understandings’. Or, as he puts it, ‘anarchy is what states make of it’.7

But constructivism’s equal weighting of the domestic and the system level, and of the ideational and the material (let alone the prioritising of the domestic in the other FPA approaches briefly referred to) runs counter (as does straight realism) to a final set of approaches: although structuralist/materialist like neo-realism, this set is broadly Marxian-derived (even if not all its authors would consider themselves Marxist). Here, as in neo-realism, states’ interaction and foreign policy are seen as shaped largely by structures beyond the state level, but particular emphasis is given to the persistent dominance of some states – those of the ‘rich’, ‘developed’, ‘core’ – over a group of poorer, ‘peripheral’,
‘dependent’ ones, in a capitalist international political economy. In these latter approaches, what transpires within states may be of relatively little importance, nor are so-called ‘dependent’ actors (a category usually covering all developing states, as well as, in some interpretations, ‘small’ states) usually seen as having any significant autonomy. Some versions of dependency thinking, admittedly, see developing states’ policy as constrained, rather than simply determined, from without. It has also been suggested that there may be coincidence of interests between elites in ‘periphery’ and ‘core,’ while there may be conflict between the interests of elites and populations within the periphery. There is certainly an element of such ‘coincidence’in the case of several MENA elites, who are linked to the ‘core’ economies through education, leisure, commercial interest, and the revenues they derive from the sale of hydrocarbons or aid. There is a potential conflict also between these elites and the nationalist and Islamist aspirations of some of the population – necessitating a careful balance in policy so as to maintain legitimacy. But this conflict should not be exaggerated. It is true that at particular junctures of regional/domestic crisis it may take on special significance (imagine for instance a further worsening of the Palestine conflict combined with an uncertain aftermath of the war on Iraq and economic downturn in countries such as Saudi Arabia and Egypt). But such popular aspirations are, taken separately, by no means supreme: they compete for attention with other themes, and themselves fluctuate in importance. There also is not the level of ‘comprador’ exploitation in the case of the Middle East that inspired the analyses of some dependencia thinkers. Finally, partial coincidence in such elite interests at a very general level, does not explain specific variations in policy towards different outside actors. What this caveat does already indicate, however, is the variations that particular kinds of developing states may present on the usual patterns of explanation of foreign policy (mainly related to developed states) – indeed the dependency school itself of course focused on developing states.

In any case, it must be clear that reference to structures, even structures in which states are seen as ‘dependent’, can never be sufficient on its own to explain their foreign policy behavior. One would be left without explanation for the sudden U-turn in policy of states following a domestic regime change (such as in the case of Iran after the fall of the Shah), or policy changes that occurred even without such a regime shift – as in the case of Egyptian president Sadat’s sudden switch from pro-Soviet to pro-US policies in 1972. Neither of these can be understood without taking into account a combination of domestic forces and changes, regional linkages, and developments at the international level, together with the role played by particular personalities and their particular choices.

The assumptions that should guide any attempt to understand the foreign policies of any state or group of states, then, would seem to be:

1. The search for ‘power’ is indeed an important impetus for states and regimes, as is that for ‘security’ – related but distinct, and in many cases the object of the former.
2. There is, however, no single ‘national interest’ but a range of ‘national interests’.

3. States are not monoliths but involve various groups and individuals, with the concomitant variety of interests that may or may not be clothed as ‘national’.

4. Between interests and policy intervenes a decision-making process which depends, *inter alia*, on the nature of the state, the administrative machinery involved, the ‘bureaucratic politics’ within it, and the personalities and perceptions of those involved.

5. Foreign policy is often domestically oriented: indeed, the search for ‘power’ and ‘security’ may well in the first place be domestic (as argued by Ayoob).

6. The importance of decision-makers’ perceptions relates not only to such material or political interests. Their perceptions of the nature of regional and/or international policies, and of their own identity and role as well as those of their state (and of how these may be related to transnational identities), also feed into policy-making. Indeed, as the constructivist school in IR holds, such perceptions, at a collective as well as individual level, are likely themselves in turn to help shape the nature of the regional and international systems these states operate in.

7. States and decision makers do have to face objective external challenges and opportunities, whether in their immediate environment or in the pattern of global political and economic relations. These range from the more specific and one-off – such as a military threat emerging next door after a revolution – to broader, longer-term influences. The latter comprise the ‘structural’ context focused on by ‘structuralists’ – but such structures do not determine outcomes, rather they constrain and enable.

In other words, my approach follows such diverse writers as Keohane, Gilpin, Snyder, and Siverson and Starr, in insisting on integrating domestic political factors and dynamics into IR thinking – in essence opting for ‘complex models of international politics’. Explanation, consequently, must inevitably be multi-level and multi-causal. At the same time, it is difficult, at the very least, to generalize about the precise effects of particular types of states and regimes on foreign policy, in any one-dimensional way. Instead, ‘political effects [of particular kinds of states and regimes] vary across different issues, situations, and leaders’. Explanation, therefore, must incorporate *contextuality*. Hence the crucial importance of empirical work, and of bringing area specialization and in-depth case studies to the study of IR.

**FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS AND DEVELOPING STATES**

The extent to which foreign policy determinants in ‘developing states’ differ from those in other states varies widely from case to case – quite apart from the difficulty in drawing sharp boundaries between the categories in the first place. Apart from these states’ arguably ‘dependent’ position, the causes of their
divergence from the ‘developed’ pattern would include their relative lack of resources (here the Gulf states are atypical), lower levels of state formation (and hence legitimacy), and – in part linked with this latter point – their susceptibility to trans-state identities and loyalties. Arguably, too, they will often find themselves in relatively less stable regional environments.

Third World foreign policy studies have often overplayed some factors deemed to differentiate the two groups, at the expense of others. Thus an over-emphasis on the role of a leader’s personality can obscure the domestic and external environmental determinants without which the foreign policy pattern cannot be properly interpreted; at the other extreme, an excessive focus on a country’s ‘structural’ position obscures variations in foreign policy that may result from particular domestic configurations and policy choices.\(^{18}\)

I suggested elsewhere\(^{19}\) that the most appropriate FPA approach for developing states – including those of the MENA region – would be:

1. Start an interpretation from the domestic environment and the survival imperative of regime and state.\(^{20}\)
2. View this in the context of the regional environment and transnational ideological factors.
3. Appreciate the overall limiting and enabling effects of the international environment.
4. Take into account decision-making structures and decision makers’ perceptions, since particular policy choices are indeed capable of making the sort of difference that cannot be explained by structural factors alone.

**MENA STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY DETERMINANTS**

The foreign policy ‘role’\(^{21}\) of MENA states (as that of many other developing states), must be seen as defined through the lens of the leaderships’ perceptions about the security of their regime, about the opportunities and challenges presented by both their domestic and their external environments; and, to varying extents, about their own identities. These various perceptions are, of course, interlinked. Holsti has observed that regimes’ role conceptions, often in part built on domestic political culture, can, over time, in turn ‘become a more pervasive part of the political culture of a nation [and thus become] more likely to set limits on perceived or politically feasible policy alternatives’.\(^{22}\) Yet it is misleading to think of a single role: foreign policy roles are plural, depending on the issue and the arena in question. They are also changeable: as Hill has pointed out, ‘The “belief system” of the practitioner is a deep-rooted legacy of experience and political culture, but it is also an organic set of attitudes which is capable, within limits, of self-transformation’.\(^{23}\) While the foreign policies of MENA states do show long-term patterns, one of them is precisely that they also show the adaptability that this analysis suggests.

Explanations of the foreign policies of MENA states, as those of other states, therefore, should avoid the conceptual extremes of both realism and Marxian/dependencia structuralism, without at the same time falling into the trap of over-
privileging purely domestic factors. Instead the enquiry should be open to the range of possible determinants that different schools in IR theory and Foreign Policy Analysis have drawn attention to, and systematically address them. Key questions that need to be addressed concern the relative importance of the following factors:

- The domestic versus the external environment.
- Personalities/leaders versus environmental factors.
- Economic versus political interests.
- The role of the decision-making process versus other factors.
- Autonomy versus dependence (or the debate over ‘agency’ versus ‘structure’).
- The relative importance of the regional system(s), especially in terms of its (their) transnational ideational/ideological/identity features. In the MENA case the Arab and Islamic themes are especially pertinent factors at a regional level. Contrasting approaches towards the MENA case are adopted in this respect by Barnett, who insists on the persisting importance of the theme of Arabism, and Walt, who paints a Realist picture of alliance politics; Korany and Dessouki’s edited volume adopts an intermediate position tending towards the Barnett end of the spectrum; a decade later (and perhaps this explains the difference), Hinnebusch and Ehteshami edge away from this, adopting an ‘adjusted realist’ approach.

MENA states’ foreign policies, I suggest, have in varying ways been determined by the needs of the regimes at home, the changing availability of resources, and the international strategic and economic framework within which these countries have played a subordinate but not necessarily powerless role. They have also been influenced and circumscribed by the regional ideological and political context (with especially Islamic and Arab themes), both because this links into the domestic security imperative, and because it has been a genuine element among the various role conceptions of at least some of these leaderships.

MENA countries’ policies towards, and relations with, Europe should be examined in this light. Clearly Europe’s presence on the northern shores of the Mediterranean will, itself, be part of the explanatory mosaic, as will be European policies. But the explanation should go beyond the assumption that the relationship is determined simply by the ‘Mediterranean system’ – if indeed such a system can be thought to exist. The EU and European states are, for MENA states, merely one part of a much wider, and complex, external environment determining foreign policy; by the same token, even the external environment as a whole, with its regional and global components, must be joined to the domestic environment if any credible explanation of foreign policy – and therefore also of policy towards Europe – is to emerge.

The levels on which MENA states’ FP determinants must be examined, therefore, are domestic, regional, and international. At the *domestic* level, the key categories of determinants are:
1. The nature of the state (secure/insecure, extent of ‘national’ identity consolidation; authoritarian/liberalizing, rentier/non-rentier).
2. The nature and interests of the regime.
3. Capabilities – in particular economic and technological as well as demographic resources.
4. The decision-making system.
5. Decision-makers’ perceptions and role conception.

The central aim of the regime is likely to be its own consolidation and survival, along with the two sets of aims that enable this: the acquisition of resources, and the state- and nation-building exercise.

The regional level combines, on the one hand, these states’ immediate strategic environment; and, on the other, the transnational ideological issues of (pan-)Arabism and Islam. These latter issues retain some force as a constraint on regimes’ FP behavior, and in some cases as a resource to be deployed in the pursuit of the maintenance of a domestic or regional constituency, against domestic, regional or international threats. But it is suggested that their salience has diminished relative to interests defined within the context of the territorial state, as states and associated identities have become consolidated. Nevertheless, they may become more problematic in times of crisis, not least because of popular pressure (e.g. over combined crises in Iraq and Palestine).

The international environment presents a range of resources (economic, military, political) as well as challenges and constraints (threats, dependence). The composition of this environment will vary from state to state, depending, among other things, on the state’s location. The increasing hold of the ‘globalizing’ trend in economics and politics also changes the environment within which regimes have to make their domestic and foreign policy choices. It is worth noting at this point that Europe, and particular European states, do have particular importance in this international environment, because of:

1. Europe’s very proximity.
2. The former colonial or semi-colonial ties between many of the countries of the region and European states, and their continuing impact.
3. Europe’s own position in the international system. I will return to this in the following chapter.

The three levels – or three environments – that Middle Eastern states find themselves in, need to be managed, or responded to, simultaneously. The ways in which they do this will change over time, as the relative weight of the three levels in shaping foreign policy may change along with changes taking place at the state, regional and global levels. One should add to this a fourth possible environment, or a ‘sub-environment’ within the regional system: that of their immediate surroundings, for example the Gulf sub-system, the Maghreb, or the Nile Valley. Here, too, transnational issues compete with ‘realist’ power calculations.
The interrelated domestic and regional environments impose a host of potential constraints, then, on the presumed raison d’État calculations the realist school would posit. Indeed, it makes the foreign policy calculations of Middle Eastern regimes arguably more fraught than those of other states.

They are a good case study, therefore, of Steven David’s concept of ‘omnibalancing’ – which suggests that policy makers must balance between internal and external pressures, in a decision context shaped by the main location of threats and opportunities. In other words, policy makers not only balance different elements (threats and opportunities) in the different parts of the external environment (the traditional view), they also need to balance these with the variable pressures at home. The precise ‘package’ that results will depend on the importance and location of these threats and opportunities. This mirrors Ikenberry’s view of the way in which states and the elites that staff them must engage in a constant bargaining relationship with their societies, balancing this with strategies to adjust to pressures and changes in the international environment – with the particular choices made varying according to the relative costs and benefits of these interrelated domestic and external strategies:

Adjustment may be directed outward at international regimes, or inward at transforming domestic structures, or somewhere in between in order to maintain existing relationships. Which strategy is chosen will depend in large part on the gross structural circumstances within which the state finds itself – defined in terms of state–society relations on the one hand, and position within the international system on the other.

Inherent in this analysis is that a strong, domestically secure leader will have much greater room for manoeuvre in his external bargaining, than is likely to be the case for a regime that is under serious pressure at home – an observation directly relevant to the question of ‘relative autonomy’ which I deal with later.

The shifting relative importance of the three levels which was referred to earlier, may, of course, mean that particular theoretical models may be more appropriate for understanding the dynamics of particular periods. Thus, Hinnebusch has suggested that Rosenau’s view of the most important determinants of Third World foreign policies – the global level (including military intervention), and the Leader – might be most appropriate for the early post-independent period. The 1950s and 1960s, by contrast, arguably were a period where the external factor became relatively less dominant given the Cold War context, while the domestic scene became commensurably more important – making David’s omnibalancing model especially relevant. During the 1970s and 1980s, war became more pervasive in the region and the threat from neighbors much more important; at the same time, states were beginning to master the domestic environment. Consequently, here the Realist model might become a better approximation of the dynamics observed (the exception would be Iran, with its 1979 revolution, which would be comparable with the 1950s to 1960s period in the Arab world). Finally, Hinnebusch suggests, the 1990s might be viewed as ushering in a new era, where decision makers are sandwiched
between much increased pressures from the global level, and growing pressures domestically. In this new context, the hegemon’s ability to intervene militarily is back on the agenda (possibly making it less likely that MENA states will opt for military action), while economic asymmetry is perceived to be on the increase. The combined effect of these factors, and attempts to resist them, may be one explanation for a re-emergence of transnational ideology as a salient factor in the politics of the region. At the same time, ‘bandwagoning’, as opposed to ‘balancing’ by MENA states may become more likely.

While the jury is still out on the latter assessment, it is clear that, over the period since the 1950s, the foreign policy orientation and behavior of MENA states have increasingly focused on the pragmatic pursuit of regime and state interests, rather than ideology, especially since the 1970s. This holds also for supposed ‘rogue’ states such as Libya, Iraq and Iran (save for exceptional periods such as the aftermath of revolution in the latter), and is especially clear in their relations with Europe. These interests are essentially those of regime survival and consolidation, and state consolidation, and the acquisition of the political and economic means to ensure them. In this, the dynamics at work are reminiscent of (albeit less extreme than) the foreign policy aims that Clapham attributes to the ‘monopoly states’ of Africa – with their negative (juridical) sovereignty, their personalist rule, and their clientelist domestic and international relations.

THE QUESTION OF (RELATIVE) AUTONOMY

A central question raised in the above debate concerns the extent to which policies are determined by the ‘dependency’ of these ‘developing’ or ‘peripheral’ states on the ‘core’ or ‘hegemonic’ actors in the international political economy – including on former colonial masters. The obverse of this question is what level of autonomy MENA and other states of the South have, or can carve out – including how and under what conditions they can do so. While recognizing that the answer may vary – for instance due to the varying global/regional contexts as suggested by Hinnebusch – I suggest that, overall, this potential for relative autonomy is greater than dependency thinking has allowed for. Pragmatic adaptation to changing circumstances in all three environments (domestic, regional, global) and adjusting policy accordingly, will often be necessary if they are to be dealt with effectively simultaneously. This need not mean that these states are necessarily at the whim of greater powers. I have presented some evidence elsewhere for the case of the Gulf states, showing that they have often been able to carve out a very significant relative autonomy from the main ‘hegemon’ of the day – the Ottoman Empire, Britain and the US. I would argue, moreover, that this can be combined even by a very small and vulnerable state such as Qatar, with simultaneous relative autonomy from its vastly larger regional would-be hegemon, Saudi Arabia. While allowing for the fluctuations suggested by Hinnebusch, I would interpret the available evidence as showing that states are rarely totally without at least the potential for some such relative autonomy.

A different way of approaching this question is to ask whether they find themselves forced to align their foreign policy with that of larger powers,
whether in the region or beyond: what patterns of alliance emerge. The traditional assumption is that the smaller, weaker, and more ‘dependent’ a state is, the smaller the chance that it can do anything but align with a major outside power. Even here, it theoretically could, during the Cold War, choose between two camps – although other domestic factors and agendas would often make the choice almost inevitable. For the case of sub-Saharan Africa, Clapham has shown that domestic insecurity and dearth of resources have combined there with small size to predispose a state towards alignment, while only the larger and domestically better established states and regimes had more of a chance to opt for non-alignment, or for aligning with one power while cultivating links with its rival, thus pre-empting any challenge from this rival through domestic or regional opponents of the regime.\textsuperscript{35} A domestically secure leader, argues Clapham, will have a freer choice between an alignment (bandwagoning, or clientelist) strategy, and a non-aligned, balancing strategy – both offering benefits and disadvantages. By contrast, ‘[w]hen leaders faced appreciable domestic threats, the demands of omnibalancing became considerably more intricate, and their scope for independent action was correspondingly reduced’.\textsuperscript{36}

The usual assumption is that the end of the Cold War has reduced that room for maneuver. In fact, opportunities for pragmatic balancing and ‘polygamy’ persist – not least in the case of the MENA region, although I will argue that here too, the factor of domestic strength is and remains important.

What is clear is that this balancing game may require gradual adaptation in general foreign policy roles. In turn, such pragmatic adaptation both in role conceptions and performance requires a degree of autonomy from the domestic and regional constraints already referred to. Indeed, while it is the very interlocking of the different levels in their foreign policies that helps give regimes room for maneuver, at the same time it is precisely by flexibly activating this degree of autonomy at one or more levels relative to one or more other levels (domestic, regional, international), that it can ultimately be maintained most securely.

The room for maneuver which adept local leaders may be able to turn into the required relative autonomy at the three levels, emerges from the combination of two sets of circumstances, domestic and external. The domestic factors are, in essence, the availability of material and political resources. Material resources come in many forms, including most prominently that of hydrocarbon riches. With political resources I mean first and foremost the already established level of political legitimacy for state and regime, alongside those tools that allow further consolidation. Or as Hinnebusch and Ehteshami put it: ‘the higher the level of state formation, the lower the level of constraints on the pursuit of reason of state from international dependency and trans-state penetration’.\textsuperscript{37}

The external circumstances include limitations on, and competition between, great powers – a factor which will significantly fluctuate over time. Crucially, they also include the global scattering of great power interests, as opposed to local actors’ ability and propensity to concentrate on their immediate region – often compensating to some extent for the absolute power differential.

Moreover, some states’ possession of a valued resource, whether in strategic position, in oil, in wealth, or otherwise, may afford it some leverage with greater
powers. By contrast, the very insignificance of a state may mean that it does not command the level of external powers’ attention and resources needed to constrain its autonomy.38

Indeed, the question of the relative power and influence of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ states needs to be considered not in overall absolute terms, but by considering what, for the supposedly weaker party, is most relevant in terms of its foreign policy aims. For most developing states, this is unlikely to be the battle with the great powers. Even if in a direct trial of strength at the global level, they would probably lose out, that sort of trial of strength is not where their main attention is likely to be focused. Rather, they are likely to direct their attention and energy towards the regional arena – in addition to those global issues that directly affect their interests, such as negotiations over trade regimes and, for the Gulf states, the world energy markets. Within their region there are many dynamics over which outside powers have little or no control, and which they cannot predict. In the case of the MENA states, a partial exception may be policy on Israel. Even this, however, arguably is rarely the top concern for these states, unless the domestic position of the regime is in question. Another possible exception would be the Gulf arena, as here such vital interests for outside powers are concentrated. In fact, the evidence shows that having such interests does not equate with ability to direct things at will – indeed quite the contrary: Turkey’s and Saudi Arabia’s refusal to give the US the assistance it wanted in the Iraq operation of 2003 and, indeed, the Qatari government’s refusal to rein in the satellite TV channel Al-Jazeera, are telling examples.

To sum up the argument: the international-level constellation of factors referred to above (which will vary from period to period and from case to case) provides the fluctuating room for maneuver within which the pragmatic multi-level balancing game becomes possible. The long-term foreign policy patterns of managed multi-dependence and pragmatism which I suggest can be observed in a number of MENA states are a crucial part of this. Indeed, the pragmatic adaptation in role conception and performance displayed by these regimes in playing off outside powers against each other and avoiding ‘mono-dependence’, is necessary to take advantage of this constellation of factors. Yet this in turn will at times require a degree of regime autonomy from domestic and regional ideological pressures or constraints. Such autonomy can be acquired through the judicious use of resources available from outside powers and at home, and is itself potentially reinforced as an outcome of the overall ‘game’. On the one hand, as already suggested, a key domestic resource in this game is domestic legitimacy; the further advanced the level of state formation, the easier it will be to transcend regional constraints. On the other, successful deployment of the omni-balancing strategy may ultimately help the process of state formation and increase regime legitimacy. In other words, if this game is played successfully, it may in turn lead to greater autonomy at all levels – not only international, but also domestic and regional, creating a positive feedback loop.

None of this is to claim that such autonomy is anything but relative. Indeed, while the states benefiting from the most helpful combination of the factors above are in a position of asymmetrical interdependence rather than dependence
tout court, they remain vulnerable and the weaker part of the asymmetry. Similarly, my conclusions about the predominance of pragmatism certainly do not mean that transnational issues would lose their importance altogether as a factor in foreign policy; yet it does mean that, against the background of state consolidation and under the conditions outlined, their impact lessens relative to other concerns, as merely one influence among many. While astute policy making, as displayed for instance by the Gulf ruling families, has been important in making the most of this potential virtuous circle, it seems plausible that the underlying dynamic applies more generally to small states – indeed perhaps even more so: most states face less powerful transnational ideological pressures and constraints than do those of the Middle East.

In the following contribution, the specific domestic, regional, and international environments that impact on MENA states’ foreign policy making, are analyzed in greater detail, before offering some preliminary conclusions about the defining features of MENA states’ foreign policies towards Europe.

NOTES

1. This was particularly so during the period of the Cold War. As Clapham puts it: ‘the dominant focus was on the relationship between the superpowers, with a secondary but still important emphasis on relations between other industrial states such as those of Western Europe. Even the study of “North–South” relations characteristically had a heavy emphasis on North–South relations, . . . rather than on South–North ones’. Christopher Clapham, Africa and the International System: the Politics of State Survival (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 3.
4. Raymond Hinnebusch and Anoushiravan Ehteshami (eds.), The Foreign Policies of Middle Eastern States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2002).

17. Joe Hagan, ‘Domestic Political Explanations in the Analysis of Foreign Policy’, p. 120.


30. Discussion paper at Workshop on ‘The Determinants of Middle Eastern and North African States’ Foreign Policies: With Special Reference to Their Relations with Europe’, at the *Third Mediterranean Social and Political Research Meeting*, Florence and Montecatini Terme, March 20–24, 2002. Subsequently elaborated also in the new chapter added to this book (pp. 243 – 256) (developed from his review article in the original version of this volume in the Special Issue of *Review of International Affairs* (vol. 2, no. 3 (Winter 2003/04)).

31. This is notwithstanding the stress laid on the ideological factor in Moshaver’s contribution on Iran, in this volume: indeed, in the final analysis, the ‘average’ of Iran’s policy output since the late 1980s does in fact conform to the pattern I outline.


36. Ibid., p. 65.


38. Morgenthau made a similar point with reference to the independence of small states: Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations* (New York: Knopf, 1964 – 3rd ed.), p. 177, where he refers to ‘their lack of attractiveness for imperialistic aspirations’. Morgenthau also already recognized the factor of great power competition.
The Three Environments of Middle East
Foreign Policy Making and Relations with
Europe

GERD NONNEMAN

Given the framework for analysis presented in the previous chapter, which
proposed that MENA states’ foreign policy needs to be analyzed as shaped by
three inter-linked and interacting environments – domestic, regional and
international – this contribution takes a closer look at each of these specific
environments for the states and policy makers of the Middle East and North
Africa. At the domestic level, the evolving questions of state and regime
consolidation and legitimacy are central, with the related issues of political
economy and political development. At the regional level, the salient features,
with respect to foreign policy, of the Arab and Middle East region as a whole are
considered, before looking at each of the region’s component sub-regions: the
Gulf, the Mashreq, and the Maghreb. Attention is also drawn to the impact of
states’ immediate environment. Europe, and European policy towards the
region, are a key part of the external environment, straddling the regional and
international categories. The significance of this European factor is assessed, and
an outline given of the evolution of European policy towards the region. Finally,
a number of preliminary conclusions are offered about the defining features of
MENA states’ foreign policies towards Europe.

THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT

The central pursuit of most MENA regimes remains that of domestic survival –
and the search for legitimacy, acquiescence and control to assure this, in turn
supported by a search for resources to deploy in this domestic quest. The root of
these dynamics remains in the inadequate ‘stateness’ of many of the countries in
question, combined with a failure to ‘perform’ either politically or economic-
ally. After the bankruptcy of quasi-socialist experiments from the 1950s to the
early 1980s, there has been no real economic take-off under the half-hearted
economic reforms introduced since the mid-1980s (and since the 1970s in
Egypt). The oil revenues which aided the rich oil producers directly, and the rest
of the Middle East indirectly through aid and opportunities for migrant
employment, lost their luster even in the Gulf with the 1986 slump in prices that
badly affected the regional economy as a whole. Indeed, after the temporary
boom of the 1970s and early 1980s, came a decade in which the countries south of the Mediterranean suffered the sharpest decline in real wealth (GNP per capita) of any region in the developing world, amounting to some 2 percent per year. At the political level, the prevailing pattern remained one of autocratic rule – albeit with some variations. By and large, governments have reacted with clamp-downs to the challenges posed by these economic difficulties (including large-scale unemployment), even in places where there had been some evidence of liberalization previously – such as Tunisia, Egypt, and Jordan.

It is interesting to note that it is in the monarchies of the Gulf that some contrary dynamics appear to emerge: parliamentary politics remains as lively as ever in Kuwait (though still constrained in its influence), while Qatar and Bahrain appear to be moving in the same direction at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Following the adoption of its new constitution, turning the country into a Kingdom, Bahrain held the first elections for its new parliament in October 2002 (although the elected lower chamber is balanced by an appointed second chamber); the elections brought a respectable turn-out even though boycotted by some, and were free and fair. The political reforms brought the King and Crown Prince unprecedented popularity (and strengthened their position relative to rival voices within the royal family). In Qatar, a new constitution was approved by referendum in April 2003, stipulating a parliament that will be two-thirds elected, one-third appointed, and that will have legislative power; elections are expected in 2004. In both cases the move appeared to be a conscious policy by the ruler to strengthen domestic legitimacy. In the case of Qatar the announcement of the referendum coincided with the winding down of the Qatar-based but domestically unpopular US–UK operation against Saddam’s Iraq – a policy which the key decision makers felt was in Qatar’s best raison d’état interests given its immediate regional environment (not least Saudi Arabia): in sum, a perfect example of omni-balancing, while also still maintaining some distance from the US by contrary policies on other issues (for example, al-Jazeera).

Iran remains a case apart, with the most lively of parliamentary political dynamics combined with a determined battle to contain it by the Supreme Leader and the political conservatives.

There is no space here to delve deeply into the debates on democratization and its problems in the Middle East. Yet very worthwhile work has been undertaken in the past decade or so, in which it possible to discern an implicit consensus on a number of points:

1. The discourse of democracy and pluralism has become more widespread. Yet Arab commentators have pointed out that while ta’addudiya (which can mean anything from multipartyism to pluralism) has become somewhat more prevalent, dimuqratiyya is still some considerable way off.

2. It has been shown that there is no such thing as an overarching Arab–Islamic political culture which might provide an explanation, and that political behavior and attitudes are to a large extent adaptive to social settings and shaped by political context. The self-described Islamist
character of a movement tells us nothing useful about its behaviour unless placed in the appropriate political and social context.\(^5\)

3. Different types of impulses towards liberalization can be identified – from mass pressures (caused by changes in the implicit ‘social contract’ driven by state failure, financial crisis, and the effects of globalization-induced economic reform); to external pressures; and, thirdly, voluntary limited reform from above. The latter type has been most in evidence, with regimes taking pre-emptive action to maintain a constituency or create new ones. The effects of regime change in Iraq will be multifarious and by no means uni-directional.

4. The limitations to liberalization so visible in much of the MENA region are explained in terms of two main structural factors. The first lies in the dynamics of rentierism, where the state has a large degree of autonomy from society by virtue of external revenue; it delivers ‘goods’ to the population, demanding little in return except acquiescence. Yet, as recognized by one of the concept’s most prominent advocates,\(^6\) the rentier dynamic proved to have its limits: on the one hand, state resources were declining relative to demands; on the other, it appeared that other factors could cut across the presumed ‘no taxation, no representation’ implications. The second type of structural explanation contradicts the optimistic assumption found in some strands of democratization studies, that with economic liberalization comes an expansion of the bourgeoisie, which in turn becomes an increasingly significant pressure group for political liberalization. Work by Hinnebusch and others showed that in many cases, the new bourgeoisie was created by, and allied with, the state, and thus did not have an interest in any political opening up beyond that which safeguarded their own economic position and influence.\(^7\) Economically, domestic freedom to exploit opportunities is welcomed, as is ability to import – but the threat of real international competition that would result from lifting protection is not.\(^8\)

Murphy presents a related and compelling argument, based in part on an in-depth study of Tunisia, with implications for foreign policy.\(^9\) On the one hand, internal economic weaknesses combine with the pressure of the international political economy to undercut the regime’s existing tools to build legitimacy. Two key tasks in which the state is seen as performing deficiently – and which were central to the state–society bargain – are the role of provider and that of defending the ‘Arab cause’. The falling away of these pillars of legitimacy, combined with the painful effects of economic liberalization, force regimes to adapt. At the same time, however, the corporatist structures in society and politics upon which the system relied, are directly affected by economic liberalization: the latter ‘reinforces horizontal stratification at the expense of the vertically stratified interest group articulation which provides the political structures of corporatism’. The tactical, limited political liberalization that may be adopted as a policy response, tends to ‘become unstuck when the state is forced to choose between its own survival and the emerging popular political demands . . . [and] between limited political openings for its potential allies in
economic reform…, and its desire to prevent challenges to its own supremacy’.10

Clearly, this has implications for regime strategies of getting access to resources from the external environment: on the one hand, they often need such resources; on the other, the 1990s have also seen an increasing trend in political conditionality being imposed on economic (or indeed wider) agreements. A striking example, of course, is the Barcelona process. This inevitably means further pressure to loosen the reins adding to the already existing pressure coming from the economic liberalization agendas that form the other side of such outside agreements. It is likely that regimes in such cases will at least temporarily try to insulate themselves from the political consequences of these pressures. This may take the form of stalling on the most sensitive ‘governance’ elements of such agreements (which would become visible in protracted or stalled negotiations); shelving implementation of the domestic commitments made in such agreements, or emasculating them in other ways; and possibly, an eventual willingness to forego active pursuit of such resources where the conditions are politically unpalatable. The case of Tunisian policy towards Europe, for instance, would seem to include all three strategies.

Moreover, the economic liberalization strategy being urged on the southern Mediterranean countries – not least in the context of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative (EMP) – may itself be problematic. Several economists and political economists working on the issue have recently argued that these measures are likely to bring hardship.11 Indeed, ‘it may not be possible to fully offset any decline in existing manufacturing production and employment by attracting new investment’, as one economist puts it.12 In addition, trade diversion may become larger than trade creation, and because tariffs still vary so widely within the region, additional ‘shifting’ effects would be added to this.13 One of the most damning criticisms, perhaps, is that EMP is in any case not to be a consistent application of the Washington consensus principles for the developing world – both because geographically selective trade liberalization may introduce welfare-reducing distortions and because EMP goes against the key assumption that resources will be moved into agriculture.14 Indeed, the EU’s southern ‘partners’ complain with justification that agriculture has been virtually excluded from EMP, in order to protect Europe’s own agricultural sector.

As already suggested, there are, of course, considerable differences among MENA states that mean the above cannot simply be applied across the board as implying one undifferentiated dynamic. Some states, such as Egypt and Morocco, have a stronger historical pedigree as political entities than the recent constructions of, for instance, Iraq, Jordan, or Libya. In some, such as Jordan, Kuwait, and today perhaps Qatar and Bahrain, the regimes have managed to establish a certain level of legitimacy in part through astute inclusive policies and the provision of outlets for grievances. Some, such as Jordan and Yemen, suffer from extremely precarious economies – in contrast to, for instance, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates with their small populations and large hydrocarbon revenue sources. All of this tends to be reflected in greater or lesser degrees of security – and ultimately levels of stateness. In turn this will
affect the basic ‘average’ dynamic described earlier and consequently its impact on foreign policy. It can also affect foreign policy in other ways. For instance, even within the group of oil producers different needs may lead to different policies. Iran has relatively lower oil reserves and a very large population, and will therefore be relatively less interested in the very-long-term future of the oil market. Moreover, it faces higher immediate needs than Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE, where the opposite applies. Iraq falls in between these two ends of the spectrum, although its reconstruction and eventual rearment needs (or desires) nudged it towards a higher-price stance (a new, Western-friendly regime might slant somewhat in the other direction, but this is not a foregone conclusion).

Finally, a word on the decision-making structures. Clearly, they vary from state to state, along with the particular make-up of the regime – a subject which is the task of individual case studies rather than a general analysis such as this one. With the exception of Lebanon and Iran, however, where the decision-making picture is complex and conflicting domestic factions need to be satisfied and are themselves involved, the general pattern is one of the total domination by the very top of the executive – be it the figure of the ruler alone, or a very small oligarchy (as, for instance, in the case of the senior princes of the Al-Saud, or the Syrian leadership under Bashar al-Asad).

THE REGIONAL ENVIRONMENT

As indicated above, the ‘regional’ category in MENA states’ external environment can itself be subdivided. First there is the widest, ‘Middle East’ system, which includes all the themes and complexities of ethnic and religious rivalries, ‘Arabism’, and Islam, as well as the stresses caused by protracted conflicts – most prominently the Palestinian issue. This category, of course, is influenced by both the domestic and the international environment. Within this, the largest sub-category is the ‘Arab system’. There are in addition a number of recognizable sub-systems, with differentiating consequences for the foreign policies of the states of the Middle East region, and all of them influenced by the domestic, regional, and international environments. Finally one could also argue that Europe itself also forms part of the ‘regional’ environment by virtue of its proximity.

The ‘Arab World and the Middle East

The ‘Arab system’ has become gradually less dominant as a policy determinant since the 1970s. Pan-Arabism as an ideology has virtually vanished from the scene. Arab themes in general no longer have the force they had between the 1940s and the use of the oil weapon in 1973. State and regime interests have become predominant, in a context of interdependence both within the region and with the world beyond it – even if this interdependence is skewed in favor of the industrialized economies. Yet an Arab dimension persists. In part this is true because of residual convictions among ruling elites, but probably more so because many perceive the danger of ignoring what remains a potent, albeit no
longer the dominant, value among their populations.\textsuperscript{15} The Palestine question is still an issue to be reckoned with in this respect. It also has its Islamic resonance, focusing in particular on Jerusalem. This not only reinforces its relevance in the Arab world, but extends it to non-Arab Iran (and the Islamic world at large). Together, lingering memories of outside domination, grievances over Palestine and the perception of the USA as Israel’s uncritical supporter, continue to fuel the persistence of nationalist motifs in popular feelings. Consequently, close collaboration with the USA retains elements of political risk. That is the main reason why most Arab regimes sharply limited even their de facto collaboration with the US–UK operation against Iraq in 2003, while adopting an anti-war declaratory foreign policy.

Moreover, the relative eclipsing of Arab and Islamic ideological themes is not necessarily irreversible. As Hinnebusch suggests,\textsuperscript{16} it is at least conceivable that the combined increasing pressures on regimes from above (the attempted assertion of US hegemony plus globalization/economic liberalization) and below (due to government failure and economic liberalization, together with restiveness over Western and regime policy in the region), could result in a return to greater prominence of regional themes. But this would most likely be a shift in degree rather than in kind, could itself prove temporary, and would not affect all of the region equally. Regimes’ omni-balancing strategies are both an illustration of, and further reinforce, a trend that reduces the salience of such transnational themes relative to others in determining foreign policy, leaving them as just one influence among many.

The Middle East system also contains straightforward strategic features, quite separate from Arab or Islamic values. One of these is Israel’s regional superpower status and nuclear capability, which remain a central concern. It is at least part of the reason for feelings of insecurity on the part of other states and attempts to ameliorate this. By the same token, one may note that Israeli objections to other states’ acquisitions of sophisticated weaponry have long bedeviled US–Gulf relations, for instance, hence giving opportunities to European competitors.\textsuperscript{17} The other factor consists of the implications of the rich–poor divide in the region – with the Gulf states, and the GCC in particular, falling in the rich camp. This has long been a source of potential insecurity for the latter, again feeding into their foreign policies towards the Middle East, the Muslim world, and potential protectors elsewhere.

The region also features a number of sub-regional environments, or ‘systems’, viz. the Gulf, the Eastern Arab world, the Western Arab world and the Arab–Israeli theatre. The latter can also be seen both as part of general Middle Eastern environment already discussed, and as a sub-set of the Mashreq dynamics.

\textit{The Gulf}

The dynamics of regional relations in the Gulf since the 1970s have been driven mainly by four factors:\textsuperscript{18}

1. Ideological clashes.
2. Differential attitudes to outside powers.
4. The interests of rulers/ruling families (including dynastic rivalries).

For the GCC states in particular, the two key driving concerns in their regional foreign policy have been external and domestic security. For the former, three means have been pursued: external protectors; collective security within the GCC; and the ‘management’ of regional relations through cautious diplomacy (including ‘riyal-politik’). The maintenance of domestic security has meant the need to keep revenues flowing; to avoid being seen as totally dependent; and to collaborate in the GCC. Moreover, in contrast to the smaller Gulf states, Saudi Arabia has also seen itself as rightfully dominant on the Arabian peninsula.

The sub-system of the Gulf has featured several types of clashes. The most obvious ones have been the ideological ones between Arab-nationalist, secular republican Iraq, revolutionary-Islamic republican Iran, and the neo-traditionalist conservative pro-Western GCC monarchies. It goes without saying that this forms a large part of the explanation for the monarchies’ continued desire for outside protection. It also helps explain the support Western powers gave Iraq during the 1980s against the perceived threat emanating from Iran’s revolution. Yet by the 1990s, Iran had matured into essentially a status-quo power and was increasingly being perceived as such, even if concerns about radical factions (and, for the UAE, about territorial claims) remained. Instead, a common concern and wariness about Iraq united Iran and most of the GCC states – and arguably helped bring Iran closer to the West as well.

The issue of Palestine continues to link non-Arab Iran with the Arab world. Genuine concern with the asymmetrical nature of the Israeli–Palestinian peace process is reflected in Iran’s foreign policy stances. Although these perceptions are no longer translated in official support for the eradication of the Jewish State, Iran (and not merely that country’s ‘conservative’ factions) still reserves the right to disagree with the nature of the process, outside pressure notwithstanding. This, just like the whole question of outside involvement in the first place, ties in to the nationalist reflex. Tehran has also reserved the right to support, for instance, Hizbullah, as a Lebanese movement resisting foreign occupation. Iranians reasonably argue this is quite different from ‘sponsoring terrorism’. In contrast to the US and Israel, European governments have generally recognized this distinction, which in turn has facilitated Iranian relations with Europe (even if there remain concerns over actions by radical factions in Iran, and over WMD questions).

Yet clearly, such trans-national causes and ideological differences have been only one factor in Gulf tensions, as plain geostrategic and economic interests were also at stake. With the gradual disappearance of the ideological causes of threat in the region (Iraq’s since the mid-1970s, and Iran since the mid-1980s), the remaining potential causes for clashes in the Gulf include:

1. Attitudes to outside powers (with the GCC states on one side of the fence, Iran on the other, and Iraq as yet undetermined).
2. Hegemonic clashes between Iran versus Iraq versus Saudi Arabia.
3. Economic policy, given the different interests of the various states.
4. The question of access to the sea, between Iraq and Kuwait.
5. Other boundary and dynastic disputes – although these are now being contained, the most problematic issue being the Iran–UAE dispute over Abu Musa and the Tunbs.

The first of these needs little further comment, except to note the modest gradual readjustment in Saudi security policy from 2001, towards a less visible reliance on the US presence and greater cooperation with Iran. This will only be reinforced following the Iraq war of 2003. As regards the second point, both Iran and Iraq have traditionally viewed themselves as meriting a leading role in the region. Saudi Arabia has, pragmatically, not aimed to eclipse either of the two, but has rather played a balancing game whenever possible. With regard to the smaller Arab Gulf states and Yemen, however, the Saudi leadership maintained a hegemonic ambition.

It is worth noting, finally, the growing influence of non-Gulf powers in the expanding Middle East on the Gulf states themselves. Turkey and Syria present threats and opportunities for Iraq and Iran, while Iran faces a range of potential threats along its Northern and Eastern borders. In turn, such factors inevitably influence perceptions in the Gulf, and beyond.

The Mashreq, or Eastern Arab World

The Mashreq presents a complex foreign policy environment because of its direct and close inter-linkage with those of the Gulf (Iraq, Iran, aid) and the Arab–Israeli theatre, and the domestic effects which both have had in Mashreq states, combined with the ideological and historical rivalries that have long riven it. This sub-region is also, through Syria, Iraq and Israel, linked to Turkey and that country’s domestic politics (regarding secularism and the Kurdish issue) and foreign policies (with regard to water, NATO and the EU in particular). A subset of this environment comprises the Israel–frontline states encounter: the local expression of the wider regional Arab–Israeli theme. These states, albeit in varying ways and employing different ideological frameworks and ‘patrons’, inevitably always needed to devote a significant amount of attention and resources to this theatre, balancing the Israeli threat with the resources available from the Arab world on the one hand and the international environment on the other, and with the pressures from their domestic audience. Indeed, for the Mashreq as a whole, it is clear that the theme of Arabism has been significantly stronger than in either the Maghreb or the Gulf.

The Maghreb, or Western Arab World

Factors characterizing the Maghreb sub-region include the Algerian domestic troubles and their spill-over effects; the partial exclusion of Libya from outside powers’ relations with the region (Libya remains outside the Barcelona framework at the time of writing, for instance); the proximity of Europe, and a European colonial past; and these countries’ borderline and interaction with
black Africa. They share a common history of attempts at North African unity, culminating in the creation of the Arab Maghreb Union (AMU or, in its French acronym, UMA). Sharp disagreement over the Western Sahara between Morocco on the one hand and Tunisia and Algeria on the other continues to obstruct the effectiveness of such attempts. As Joffé has observed, the fate of moves towards regional integration in North Africa has also depended to a significant extent on the region’s relations with Europe. Indeed, the very dependence of these countries’ economies on the link with Europe, alongside the European policy of fostering integration in North Africa since the start of the 1990s – but at Europe’s own pace and in accordance with European choices (witness the exclusion of Libya) – did have a huge impact on the regional politics and economics of the Western Arab world. Indeed, contrary to the Mashreq and the Gulf, it has been Europe, not the US, that has been the dominant outside power here: Washington has evinced much less interest – although it is conceivable that energy concerns might yet change this.

The Immediate Environment

As will already have become clear from some of the above, much of the foreign policy calculations of MENA states’ regimes derive simply from their immediate environment, quite apart from wider regional or subregional factors – even if the latter often influence the former, and vice versa. Yemen’s relationship with Saudi Arabia has long been one of mutual suspicion and rivalry, mixed with Yemen’s economic need for aid from, and labor markets in, its large neighbor: part of the country’s, and the regime’s, general need for access to resources. Yemen’s relationship with the GCC as a whole and its attempts to gain a closer association with the grouping is similarly predicated on Yemeni economic needs, but suffers from lingering resentment over Yemen’s position during the Gulf war, and, more fundamentally, from the country’s very poverty, the state’s incomplete political control and its size as a potential threat.

In turn, the five small GCC states’ foreign relations are shaped to a significant extent by their proximity to their vastly larger and more powerful Saudi neighbor – bringing a mix of opportunities and constraints (the latter in turn giving rise to strategies to overcome them, by looking beyond the Gulf: Qatar is perhaps the prime example).

Iraq’s and Iran’s strategic rivalry looms large in both countries’ foreign policy calculations. Iraq (regardless of regime change) also has a specific concern over the water link with Turkey, as does Syria. Damascus, moreover, has two other immediate environmental concerns (apart from that of Israel): the persistent rivalry with Iraq and the historical–nationalist theme of Lebanon. By the same token, Lebanese foreign policy cannot be understood without taking into account the large influence of the Syrian factor.

Egypt’s particular local environment encompasses the Nile valley and attendant questions, as well as relations with its troubled southern neighbor, Sudan. For Libya, the presence of large and influential Egypt – long the heart of Arabism – next door, has long had a particular influence. In addition, Libyan oil wealth and its small population offered a natural market for Egyptian migrant
labor. For Tunisia, the presence of turbulent Algeria on one side, and maverick Libya on the other, has inevitably posed major concerns. And for Morocco, a similar concern over Algeria has been combined with the local dispute over the Spanish Sahara (which also became one of the obstacles to North African integration).

THE INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

The end of the Cold War remains a watershed also for the foreign policy environment of the MENA states. Prior to this, states in the region (as elsewhere in the developing world) had the option of aligning with either of the two superpowers, or balancing between the two – as indeed many did. The usual assumption is that the falling away of the Soviet Union, leaving a single superpower dominant in world politics, has meant a concomitant reduction in states’ ability to maneuver. I have already argued that this fails to acknowledge the various other mechanisms through which states can carve out a measure of autonomy. Moreover, the disappearance of the Soviet Union did not mean there were not other significant actors to be turned to, or resources to be had, for regimes that cared to look. The evidence is that, while there was indeed a reassessment of their options, leading to a partial Syrian alignment with the West in the 1990–91 Gulf War, for instance, this re-ordering of foreign policy patterns was neither universal nor permanent. Nor was the US always able or willing to enforce compliance where it was not forthcoming. September 11, 2001, did put further pressure on foreign policy elites in the region and beyond, but again subsequent developments showed that regimes were, once more, omnibalancing – leading, for instance, to considerable friction in the Saudi–US relationship. States resisting forced compliance with US policy preferences could also derive succor from the existence of other poles of influence in the world system – including Russia, China, India, and Europe – and of other sources of aid, trade and military supplies. The fate of the Iraqi regime of Saddam Hussein is *sui generis*: the combination of factors which caused and enabled massive military action here in 2003, is not present for any of the other states – even if some in the neo-conservative camp in the US might wish it otherwise.

Indeed, it can be argued that the disappearance of bi-polar clarity in world politics brought a less predictable pattern which in some ways increased states’ options.

Nevertheless, one major source of balancing did disappear. Equally importantly, perhaps, was the change in international assumptions on governance and good economic management that coincided with the end of the Cold War, and the increasing hold of ‘globalization’. ‘Good governance’ became the new hegemonic discourse both of the West and international organizations. At the same time principles of economic restructuring and liberalization became increasingly forcefully propagated. Combined with the declining economies and domestic resources of the vast majority of the MENA regimes, and their consequent need for aid and full integration in the world
trading system via membership of the WTO, this has meant that they have come under increasing pressure to adjust at home (see above). In turn, the combination of these external and internal pressures may be reflected in adjustments in foreign policy, if regime legitimacy is at stake.

It is also undeniable that changes at the global level have influenced developments within the region and its sub-regions. Without such changes, the course of the Iran–Iraq war might have been somewhat different and the Kuwait crisis might not have occurred. When it did, its outcome would certainly have been different. Nor is it likely that without the combined effects of these developments, alongside the internal dynamics of the intifada in Palestine, there would have been a ‘peace process’, however flawed, that in its turn drastically affected the policy options of regional states. Similarly, the combined effects of the election of George W. Bush as US President, and September 11, leading to a different US policy stance in general and to the military overthrow of Saddam Hussein in particular, brought both new strains to MENA governments (US pressure in one direction, domestic and regional pressures in another), as well as offering some opportunities – even if the question of whether or how to make use of such opportunities needed careful weighing up against the multi-level balance of other threats and resources.

EUROPE

Europe, and particular European states, have particular importance in this external environment of the MENA states. It straddles, and interacts with, their ‘regional’ and ‘international’ environments. One reason is its very proximity and thus the inevitably close interaction at the economic, security and political levels, both in substance and in (mutual) perception. A second is the former colonial or semi-colonial ties between many of the countries of the region and European states – mainly Britain and France, and to a lesser extent Italy. While such ties have in some cases left a strong nationalist reflex, they also left a legacy of personal, linguistic and economic links that continue to play a role today. A third reason is Europe’s own position in the international system, as a set of relatively important actors in their (and to a lesser extent, its) own right and both ally and rival to the one remaining superpower.

The Europe–US–MENA Triangle

US–European relations have a significant impact on the region and its foreign policy options and choices. Europe does, on the one hand, provide an alternative – one that has been vigorously pursued by many MENA states. This ties in with the divergence in interests between Europe and the US in different parts of the Middle East. On the other, it, or some of its Member States, have also retained their close security relationship with Washington, which in turn impacts on their policy towards the Middle East. By the same token, European influence has on occasions had an effect on US policy output. It is important to note, also, that the respective impact of the US and Europe varies depending on the particular sub-region involved. As Aliboni has put it, on the one hand there is ‘the Mashreq,
where the US is strongly committed both politically and militarily, with the EU playing only a secondary role in the economic field; on the other, the Maghreb, where the EU is the dominant, if not sole, actor. In other words, when assessing the impact of the international environment on the foreign policies of MENA states, it is essential to differentiate sharply within the overall MENA category: the relevant external environment varies very significantly not only at the immediate and sub-regional level, but at the international level as well.

A number of further sets of observations can be made with specific reference to the European aspect of the MENA states’ external environment. The first relates to the contrasts and tensions between the southern and northern shores of the Mediterranean; the second to the economic links, based on proximity and colonial history; and the third to the evolving European Mediterranean and Middle East policy.

**Contrasts and Tensions**

Historical and cultural tensions are perhaps the most commonly commented upon, having developed a mythological quality all their own quite apart from the underlying facts. Their current impact can only be understood, however, in the context of specific modern political and economic tensions. The political category comprises domestic as well as regional issues in the MENA region. Domestic, in that Europe (in particular France and Britain) are often perceived locally as helping to shore up regimes of dubious legitimacy (quite apart from the role they played in bringing these regimes into being in the first place). Regional, in the conflation of the memory of colonial or imperial domination with the contemporary issues of Palestine and Iraq. Here the picture is complex, however, with Britain being singled out for criticism over its support for US policy on Iraq and contrasted against other European states, and with Europe generally being positively contrasted with the USA.

The economic tension inherent in the Mediterranean space comes in the obvious form of the huge disparity in wealth between the northern and southern shores, and the opposite direction in which they have seen their economic fortunes move since the mid-1980s. As has been observed elsewhere, ‘such a widening gap causes dramatic structural instability in Europe’s international system, while projecting images of instability to the rest of the world’. By the same token, it helps shape the foreign policies of states on both sides. It must be recognized, of course, that these tensions are yet again anything but uniform across the MENA region, given the huge disparities with that region itself, setting apart the rich oil producing states from the rest.

Finally, the structural political difference between MENA and Europe must be stressed as a factor in relations past, present and future: as shown in the above section on the Domestic Environment, the ‘actors’ on the northern and southern sides are fundamentally different, even if both wear the label ‘state’. Although in European states too, foreign policy is to a large extent the domain of the executive, this executive can be considered to be a reasonably true representative of the society; there is, in other words, some sense in which
the ‘state’ as a whole can be seen to be engaged (although the caveats listed in the previous contribution (p. 120) must still be borne in mind). By contrast, the MENA ‘state’ that engages in foreign policy and relations with Europe is, for most purposes, the regime. That is not, of course, to say that only the regimes are significant in foreign relations (as opposed to policy): one example of this would be the migration pressures from the south.

**Links**

The importance of Europe’s colonial and imperial involvement in the region can hardly be overstated. Virtually all of the MENA states came under the direct or indirect rule of European powers and in many cases were in fact created by them. Leaving aside Turkey, the main exceptions are Saudi Arabia and North Yemen – but here too the influence of Britain in particular was strongly felt and, in the Saudi case, effectively used by the local regime. This history has led to persisting linkages in a number of ways, mirroring the experience of former colonies in other parts of the world. At an elite level, a pattern of personal, educational, and social connections emerged that in many cases persists today. Politically, in those states where these elites remained in power, strong links with the former metropolitan power have been maintained – as evidenced by British relations with the monarchical Gulf states. Even where nationalist struggles had swept away the former colonizer, the regimes that ended up running the state have retained strong connections – witness relations between France on the one hand, and Algeria and Tunisia on the other (this again mirrors the situation elsewhere, for instance in the former colonies of sub-Saharan Africa, including those where nationalist leaders took over at independence). A particular case is that of Lebanon, where there had long been a Christian population that looked to Europe. Following the French construction of ‘Greater Lebanon’, and the consequent complication of the domestic confessional make-up of that country, the European outlook of part of the population and the elite has continued to play a role in the Lebanese foreign policy role, in an uneasy compromise with the Arab orientation of the majority.

The economic links between MENA and Europe are self-evident if varied. For MENA states, Europe offers actual and potential markets (for oil, gas and petrochemicals in the case of the oil producers, and mainly for textiles and agricultural produce for the remainder) and, in the case of North Africa, labor markets. Viewed from the European side, it is the secure supply of predictably priced energy resources – mainly from Algeria, Libya and the Gulf – that is the key economic concern, along with access to the markets of the Gulf. Europe’s dependence on MENA energy exports (running at about 30 percent) is in itself a potential resource for the MENA exporters, either passive or active – although its active deployment has been shown to be highly problematic.

**European Policy**

The evolution of European policy towards the Middle East and North Africa up to 2000 has been adequately covered in a few recent studies, and there is a somewhat more extensive literature on the overlapping subject of Europe’s
'Mediterranean policy'. Here, an interpretive survey and update is offered. Europe’s relations with the MENA region fall into five categories:

1. Early bilateral agreements between the EC and individual MENA states.
4. The more recent EU-to-subregion agreements, since the late 1980s.
5. Subgroup-to-subgroup relations such as the ‘Five-plus-Five’ cooperation among the states of the western Mediterranean.

**Early Bilateral Agreements**

The EC’s formal relations with the MENA region started out with a number of bilateral agreements, beginning with preferential trade agreements with Lebanon and Israel in 1964, followed by an early form of association agreements with Morocco and Tunisia in 1969 and a trade agreement with Egypt in 1972. At this time, the European intention was increasingly aimed at developing a region-wide network of bilateral agreements. This would soon be followed up also in the Euro-Arab Dialogue and the development of the early Mediterranean policy. In parallel with those new directions, it also led to ‘cooperation agreements’ with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia in 1976, and Egypt, Jordan, Syria and Lebanon in 1977 and 1978. These included trade preferences as well as aid (financial protocols) that were renewed every five years. The motivation for these agreements was essentially economic and cannot simply be explained by the 1973–74 oil crisis: they had after all, begun before. It is worth noting that the EC for political reasons excluded Syria from the third and fourth of these protocols. The evolution of the Mediterranean policy would eventually attempt to bring all these bilateral agreements within a common framework.

**The Euro-Arab Dialogue**

Initiated in 1973, in the context of the Yom Kippur war and its aftermath, and formalized from 31 July 1974, the Euro-Arab Dialogue suffered from the outset from the basic fact that the two sides had ‘fundamentally different perceptions of the nature and purpose of the dialogue’. The Arab side wished it to be primarily political, the Europeans economic and technical. A working compromise led to the highest-level meetings being mainly concerned with the political aspects (including the Arab–Israeli theatre) and the specialist working groups with technical and economic matters. The EC made a major move on the Palestine issue in the form of the Venice declaration of 1980, which, issued in reaction to the Camp David agreements of 1979, codified existing policies and became the basis for European policy ever since: insisting on a comprehensive solution, the return of occupied land, the ending of settlement, and the need to refrain from changing the status of Jerusalem. Yet the subsequent deterioration in the Palestine question, and the related labeling of Syria and Libya as ‘terrorist states’, virtually paralyzed the political dialogue and thus, in effect, scuppered

The ‘Multi-Bilateral’ Mediterranean Policies

From 1972, the series of bilateral agreements between the EC and the southern Mediterranean countries began to be turned into a ‘Global Mediterranean Policy’. This ‘overall’ policy rather masked the contrast between the agreements offered to the northern Mediterranean non-EC countries (Spain, Greece, Portugal), Israel and Turkey, and those in the South: agreements with the former were significantly more far-reaching in the envisaged level of economic cooperation and free trade. Also, agreements with the southern Mediterranean states were ‘still . . . more to do with the idea of development aid than with trade in the proper sense’, the new collective-bilateral approach being in some way a reflection of the EC’s Lomé agreements with the ACP (Africa, Caribbean and Pacific) countries. After the political crisis of 1973 when the Arab states told the Community that they wanted to end all cooperation, the existing agreements had to be re-negotiated; it was, of course, also the trigger for the institution of the Euro-Arab Dialogue. By 1977, new trade and financial agreements were reached with the Maghreb and Mashreq countries. While financial flows were increased, and small, incremental advances were made in opening the EC’s market in terms of tariffs, at the same time the looming accession of Greece, Spain and Portugal led to protectionist constraints on agricultural imports being put in place, in the form of various non-tariff barriers. This would remain a source of frustration for the southern Mediterranean ‘partners’.

Until the end of the 1980s, the Global Mediterranean Policy remained little more than a haphazardly coordinated set of bilateral agreements on trade concessions and financial cooperation – the only common threads being that they comprised a framework for the EC’s relationships with those Mediterranean states not eligible for EC membership, and the common (but largely unmet) demand by these states for a stronger political dialogue.

Awareness on both sides of the various shortcomings combined with the changing international environment to lead to the institution of a ‘Renewed Mediterranean Policy’ (RMP) in December 1990. This continued the system of bilateral agreements and financial protocols (the third of which was about to expire), but brought, first, a significant increase in the funds allocated to over five billion ECU over its first five-year period (1992–96); and second, for the first time specifically allocated funds for regional projects, thus aiming at fostering regional integration within parts of the MENA region (‘horizontal funding’). Other significant features were a greater emphasis on environmental issues, improved market access for agricultural produce from the southern Mediterranean countries, and the establishment of a fund for compensation of the painful effects of economic adjustment programs in the region.

Within the RMP, the Community also began to explore sub-regional cooperation arrangements more actively. The idea of fostering sub-regional integration in the MENA region, and cooperating with such sub-regional groupings, had been raised in 1990, in part in recognition of the failure of the
more broad-based attempts until then. Indeed, the Commission found that the
southern Mediterranean states had ‘not made any use of the regional facility
available through the financial protocols for the 1986–91 period and, as a result,
not a single project involving two or more countries of the region has been
financed by the Community’. As part of this new impetus, the Commission’s
Directorate for External Relations commissioned an independent study group
report in 1991, which focused on the related issues of stability, economic
development and regional and sub-regional integration in the MENA region, and
the implications for EC policy. The report chimed with, and highlighted the
possibilities of, the incipient EC sub-regional focus (while stressing the
importance of still maintaining an overall focus alongside it). The new line was
reflected in, among other things, a new approach towards the Maghreb, with the
new Euro-Maghreb Document being agreed at the June 1992 Lisbon summit,
and the Maghreb being agreed on as an ‘area of common interest’ under the
EU’s new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). Yet the possibility of
extending the new framework beyond the Maghreb was held out. Such extension
became more plausible with the 1993 Oslo agreements between Israel and the
PLO, the EU’s involvement in the subsequent peace process, and the détente in
Arab–Israeli relations that followed: a global Mediterranean framework now
seemed somewhat more feasible.

This new trend in turn led to the holding of the Euro-Mediterranean
Conference in Barcelona in November 1995, which ushered in the ‘Barcelona
Process’, and its Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative (EMP). In the
underlying Commission paper, the rationale was clearly set out. Peace and
stability in the region was recognized as of ‘the highest priority’ for Europe, and
the key means to achieve this were:

- To support political reform, respect for human rights and freedom of
expression as a means to contain extremism.
- To promote economic reform, leading to sustained growth and improved
living standards, a consequent diminution of violence and an easing of
migratory pressures.

By this stage, the Maghreb had been joined by the Eastern Mediterranean as an
‘area of joint action’ for the EU. It seemed to make sense, therefore, to consider
a common EU policy towards the Mediterranean as a whole. The EMP claimed
to establish a comprehensive partnership among the participants, involving three
‘baskets’: a strengthened political dialogue; improved economic and financial
cooperation; and a more extensive and intensive socio-cultural basket. Yet the
process remained troubled by several factors: Libya’s exclusion, thus
complicating integration efforts even within the Maghreb; the continuation of
the ‘multi-bilateral’ nature of the framework, in effect (at least in trade) working
against rather than in favor of MENA integration; the continuing reluctance of
the EU genuinely to open its markets to textiles and agricultural produce in
particular; the persisting vagueness over the implementation of the political
basket, in particular over the papered-over democratic deficit in the MENA
region; and the worsening of the Arab–Israeli conflict since the accession of Likud Prime Minister Netanyahu in 1996 (only partially alleviated by the Barak interregnum, which was followed by a seemingly terminal downward spiral under Ariel Sharon’s stewardship in Israel since 2001). In addition, there were the MENA regimes’ fears, already indicated above, of the domestic political and economic implications of the reforms envisaged in the EMP principles.

European attention for some of these difficulties was heightened in the aftermath of 9/11 and the Iraq War, not least in the context of the ‘war on terrorism’. At the same time, the EU itself was entering a new era, with the expansion from 15 to 25 members, and the changes in political geography this brought with it: extending its borders to Russia in the East, bringing two of the three non-Arab EMP partner countries into the EU itself (Malta and Cyprus), while Turkey’s entry seemed to inch closer. These developments brought a number of policy responses from the EU, three of which are of particular relevance for our discussion.

The first was the adoption of a ‘New Neighbourhood Policy’, or the ‘Wider Europe’ policy framework, first introduced in a communication from the Commission in March 2003. This aimed

to develop a zone of prosperity and a friendly neighbourhood – a ‘ring of friends’ – … In return for concrete progress demonstrating shared values and effective implementation of political, economic and institutional reforms, … [these countries] should be offered the prospect of a stake in the EU’s internal market and further integration and liberalisation to promote the free movement of persons, goods, services and capital.

The Commission document explicitly recommended consideration of how the EU ‘could incorporate Libya into the neighbourhood policy’. Yet it still left the Gulf and the Arabian Peninsula outside its remit.39

The European Council of Thessaloniki in June, however, specifically requested the Commission and the High Representative for CFSP (Javier Solana) to formulate a policy framework and working plan to strengthen relations with the whole Arab world (building on existing frameworks including the New Neighbourhood context). The resulting policy document, Strengthening EU’s Relations with the Arab World, was presented to the Brussels Council meeting in December 2003. Notwithstanding its title, it calls in fact for complementing the EMP with a regional strategy for the ‘Wider Middle East’, i.e. including Iran. Its key foci are (1) linking the EMP (and indeed the ‘Wider Europe’ framework) with the ‘Wider Middle East’ – i.e. bringing in the Gulf and Arabian Peninsula region, not least by ‘the linking of EU-MED and EU-GCC free trade agreements, [and] including Yemen’; (2) fostering reforms; (3) making the EU’s policies and policy instruments towards the MENA region more coherent; and (4) the need to resolve the Palestine issue. On the latter, strikingly, the document states: ‘the solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict is essential. There will be little chance of dealing fully with the other problems in the Middle East until this conflict is resolved; such a solution is therefore a
strategic priority for Europe’. Indeed, this ties in with the new European security strategy (A Secure Europe in a Better World) adopted at the December 2003 Council meeting (but originally presented by Javier Solana to the June Council meeting that commissioned the Arab strategy paper): this uses an almost identical form of words.

An important part of the context for this evolving European policy was the evolution of US policy, not least the Greater Middle East Initiative (GMEI) put forward in 2003 and 2004, which could be (and was) construed as potentially duplicating or cutting across some of the EU’s existing initiatives. Not surprisingly, EU responses combined a concern for maintaining trans-Atlantic cooperation and coordination, with clear, if diplomatic, indications of concern. Thus, a follow-up report on the progress of work towards an ‘EU Strategic Partnership with the Mediterranean and the Middle East’ in 2004 stipulated that the Union should define a role that was complementary to, ‘but distinct’ from, that of the US.

Meanwhile, it remained to be seen whether the renewed emphasis on political reform in the MENA states, and the stated intention to make policies in this regard more coherent, would be given tangible and effective form. Unsurprisingly, the context of the ‘war on terror’ brought both a recognition of the desirability of such reform and a reluctance to pressure friendly regimes too hard, while there was also a strong awareness of the complexity of democratisation dynamics. The previous pattern, featuring declaratory policy combined with hesitant and inconsistent political pressure, may well in effect persist, shifting in degree only. Formally, the 2003 EU guidelines for democracy and human rights promotion commit the EU to put together agreed national plans for human rights with the Arab states in the EMP, while there has been greater pressure on the GCC to begin a dialogue on human rights. At the national level, since 2002 several EU states (Germany, the UK, France, Sweden, Denmark, The Netherlands, and most recently Finland) established or expanded government programmes, initiatives or sections related to the MENA region and to reform in particular. As of 2004, though, actual follow-through remained very limited.

Any attempt to understand the limitations of EU policy towards the MENA region must also take into account a number of internal institutional constraints that are sometimes overlooked (not least by critics in the MENA region itself). Monar has shown how the dualistic nature of the EU system with regard to foreign policy (the EC having competence for external economic relations, the CFSP for foreign and security policy), has shaped the Union’s external representation, decision-making procedures, instruments and implementation – as well as being evident in the system of democratic control. This, he argues, has had a threefold impact on the EU’s MENA policy. First, the EU remains ‘a clearing house of different interests rather than a unitary actor’ – the Barcelona process itself, for instance, flowing largely from the interests of southern Member States. Second, there is ‘an in-built tilt towards the economic domain’, since ‘CFSP is by far the weaker structure of the EU’s dual system of foreign affairs’. And third, this dualism has created difficulties for the MENA partners in terms of transparency and predictability. In addition, Monar exposes serious
problems of management, arising not least because the administration of EMP has been shifted to the Commission without any new posts being created to cope with this. The dualism also exacerbates the institutional problem of financing initiatives, while, finally, causing problems in the conduct of negotiations. Monar concludes: ‘Its partners have to accept that … the Union has in-built limitations to its capacity to act and a considerable potential for blockages in the decision making and policy implementation process’.44

A final observation is the imbalance which has been inherent in the ‘Partnership’. Instead, EU agendas and structures have remained central, with southern Mediterranean states essentially acceding to, modestly amending, or rejecting EU initiatives and formats. The recognition shown in EU policy documents since 2003 (from the New Neighbourhood policy to the paper on strengthening relations with the Arab world) of the need to address this and foster a greater sense of ‘ownership’ on the part of the southern partner countries, seems unlikely to reverse the underlying situation. Even so, the enhanced focus on the Arab world as a whole, the strong emphasis placed publicly on a resolution of the Palestine issue, and the attention for establishing linkages between the EMP and EU relations with the GCC and Yemen, are beginning to address some of the concerns felt on the Arab side about the nature of the relationship.45

Sub-regional Approaches

For reasons of space I will not comment further here on the sub-regional European initiatives towards the Maghreb, Mashreq and Arab–Israeli theatre, already mentioned earlier, beyond pointing out the increased attention given to them from the 1980s, and the subsequent revival of the more global approach; this revival did not, however, mean the end of sub-regional initiatives. It is worth briefly pausing in particular with the case of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), which, together with Iran, Iraq and Yemen, was left outside the RMP and EMP.

Both sides had long-established interests that could be served by group-to-group cooperation. From the Gulf point of view, these lay in access to Europe’s market for petrochemicals and, generally, trade concessions similar at least to those enjoyed by Israel. Europe’s interest was in domestic and regional stability in the Gulf; the creation of a framework for petroleum imports from the Gulf; and the fact that they had no formal cooperation agreements with any of the countries concerned (nor were any of the members of the GATT). The establishment of the GCC in 1981 appeared to hold out an opportunity to create effective group-to-group cooperation – especially attractive given the contrast of the faltering Euro-Arab Dialogue. In 1985, EC and GCC ministers agreed to work towards a comprehensive trade and cooperation agreement. Yet it was not until 1988 that the resulting framework cooperation accord was complete, and 1990 before it went into effect. The agreement followed the model of the EC’s agreements with the ASEAN countries, laying the emphasis on economic cooperation, and putting in place a joint council. Later in 1990, under the added spur of the Gulf crisis, negotiations began on the full-fledged preferential trade
accord that the GCC states wanted to see. For some years, however, the process remained essentially deadlocked. The initial EC mandate was rejected by the GCC as too restrictive (implying protection for Europe’s petrochemical industries) and a new round began in 1992. GCC access to the EC market remained a stumbling bloc, and the European Energy Charter (December 1991) seemingly aiming at reducing Europe’s dependence on oil, and the idea of a ‘carbon tax’ became further points of disagreement. Nevertheless, some cooperation was progressing in other fields – including on environmental issues in the Gulf, and in the form of a working party on energy cooperation.46

The hold of the European petrochemical producers’ lobby appeared gradually to wane as the 1990s wore on, and the EC stance softened. But the EU pointed to the GCC’s own failure to establish a customs union, as a major factor in blocking a free trade agreement. With the GCC’s sudden acceleration in the direction of just such a customs union (it was formally declared in January 2003 although practical implementation progressed more slowly) and an August 2003 EU-Saudi agreement regarding the Kingdom’s accession to the WTO (Saudi WTO negotiations with some other countries remained to be completed), the conclusion of an EU-GCC free trade agreement now seems a real possibility. It remains the case, however, that gradual progress on the trade aspects of the relationship have continued to be accompanied by frustration on the GCC side over the lack of a political component and the grievance over being outside the EMP orbit.47 This has been partly addressed by attempts to expand cooperation in other areas – including the 1995 decision to include instruments of ‘decentralized cooperation’ (eventually encompassing such cooperation in business, media and university/higher education – none of which had advanced very far by 2004). As shown above, the gap was also recognised in a number of policy documents in 2003 and 2004, which stressed the need to broaden and deepen the EU-GCC dialogue, and link the EU-GCC and EU-MED frameworks in some way, while also tying in Yemen. This fits into the second of the two lines of action that appear to guide EU policy towards the MENA region as of 2004: one pursuing a deepening of EMP in the Wider Europe framework; one working to develop a strategy for the ‘Wider Middle East’.48

MENA STATES’ FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS EUROPE: SUMMARY FEATURES

The results of the factors and environments discussed above, for MENA states’ policies towards Europe, are several. I would suggest they can be summarized as follows:

1. They are pragmatic rather than ideological.
2. They are based in the first place on a view of Europe as a source of economic resources (markets, aid, investment) and technology.
3. Nevertheless, some constraint continues to be imposed by the Palestine issue and its ‘Arab’ and ‘Muslim’ echoes; this is heightened when perceptions of increasing US hegemony combine with crisis in the Israeli–
Palestinian equation and a sense of government failure. The Iraq crisis of 2003 reinforced this.

4. Policies are also in some measure based on a view of Europe as a counterweight to US. The experience of the Iraq conflict of 2003 may have added some weight to this.

5. There is a residual effect of colonial/imperial relations, varying strongly between different states.

6. MENA states differentiate between European states not only because of the above factor, but also because of existing levels of economic links and interests, and because of perceived differences in European states’ foreign policy stances: differing reactions to France and Britain during the Iraq crisis and war of 2002–03 are one instance that may have lingering effects, although Britain continues to be judged as clearly on a ‘European’ trajectory over the Palestine question.

7. There are large variations flowing from the nature, needs, and location of the MENA state/regime in question. Those factors may be ‘material’ – such as domestic political structure and interests, economic profile, and strategic position – as well as ‘ideational’, in the perceptions and world views of the leaderships (the latter in turn shaped by the interplay between the regional, domestic and international ideational and material environments).

8. Two significant irritants are European reluctance genuinely to open up its own market in key sectors such as agriculture and petrochemicals and European political pressure over political reform (made more problematic albeit perhaps more necessary in a context of painful economic adjustment).

9. MENA policies towards Europe are individual (state) at least as much as collective (Arab/Muslim/Gulf/Maghreb), as a consequence both of the intra–MENA differences listed above, and Europe’s own approach, which has been predominantly bilateral (albeit masked by a wider framework in the case of the Mediterranean).

Detailed case studies should allow us to illustrate and/or test these preliminary conclusions. The remainder of this volume hopes to constitute a first step in this direction; to add more generally to our understanding of the dynamics of the international relations of the Middle East; and to help feed back these insights from the case of the Middle East into the wider field of foreign policy analysis and IR.

NOTES

2. Observation and confidential discussions in Doha, Qatar, April 2003.
3. The summary which follows is drawn from my ‘Rentiers and Autocrats, Monarchs and Democrats, State and Society: the Middle East between Globalisation, Human “Agency” and Europe’, in International Affairs, Vol. 77, no. 1 (Jan. 2001), pp. 175–95.


10. Murphy, Economic and Political Change in Tunisia, p. 8.


13. See especially the chapter by Alfred Tovias, ‘Regionalisation and the Mediterranean’ in Joffe (ed.), Perspectives on Development, pp. 75–88, as well as the contributions from Jon Marks, Grahame Thompson and Bernard Hoekman in the same volume.


16. See the discussion in the previous chapter pp.13–14.


19. As illustrated in Iran’s posture during the Kuwait crisis and the 2001 campaign against Al-Qa’ida and the Taliban in Afghanistan. For analysis underpinning this assessment see also Anoushiravan Ehteshami and Raymond Hinnebusch, Syria and Iran: Middle Powers in a Penetrated Regional System (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 43–6; Gerd Nonneman, Terrorism, Gulf Security and Palestine (Robert Schuman Centre, Policy Paper no. 2002-02) (Florence: European University Institute, 2002) (obtainable from the EUI, <www.iue.it>). I recognize this assessment is somewhat at variance with the analysis of Moshaver in this volume.


21. That is at least the view of Sid Ahmad Ghozali, former Prime Minister of Algeria, as expressed at the 1ère Forum International de Réalités: Le Maghreb et l’Europe une vue à moyen terme (Tunis, April 24–26, 2002).
30. Ibid., p. 90.
34. The report was first published in 1992, and, in its 1993 edition, as Gerd Nonneman (ed.), The Middle East and Europe: the Search for Stability and Integration.
35. See Commission document COM (93) 375, September 8, 1993, laying out a new direction for EU cooperation with the Middle East; and Commission Document COM (93) 458, 29 September 1993, on Europe’s possible role in the peace process.
43. See also Richard Youngs, ‘Europe’s Uncertain Pursuit of Middle East Reform’ (Carnegie Papers, Middle East Series, No. 45, June 2004).
45. For a good southern perspective see Mohammad El-Sayed Selim, Arab Perceptions of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (Abu Dhabi: Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2001) (The Emirates Occasional Papers, no. 42). See also the chapter by Emad Gad on Egypt in this volume.

47. These assessments are based in part on informal conversations with EU Commission officials and GCC officials and academics, in a number of meetings in Brussels, Riyadh, Kuwait, Abu Dhabi, and other locations over the period 1995–2003.

48. This was the explicit proposal in ‘Strengthening the EU’s Partnership with the Arab World’.