Malcolm Dando
| Brian Rappert Malcolm Dando |
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Since 11 September 2001 and the anthrax attacks that followed in the US, public
and policy concerns about the security threats posed by biological weapons have
increased significantly. This project examined the assumptions and implications
of national and international efforts in one such area: how a balance or integration
could take place between security and openness in civilian research. Specifically
it did so through analysing and partaking in attempts to establish international
codes of conduct for bioscientists (particularly under the Biological and Toxin
Weapons Convention). This project examined deliberations about codes in relation
to political and historical negotiations about the purposes of bioscience research
and the legitimacy of particular forms of violence. It sought to further an
understanding of how science, technology, and ethics are co-constructed through
examining attempts to establish norms for actions and categories of acceptable
research practice. The problem-orientated and engagement orientated research
design sought to foster mutual conceptual and empirical understanding of the
issues at stake regarding bioweapons between bioscientists, policy makers and
social scientists.
A number of key questions underpinned the project:
• What sort of codes and other mechanisms for controlling research have been or are being offered to reduce the threats associated with bioweapons? What threats are codes offered as a response against? How are and could they be embedded within the practices of researchers?
• How are “the norms of science” varyingly defined, articulated, and accomplished in relation to the control of biological weapons by those in national security, bioscience and social science communities? How are the significance and relevance of norms or rules about acceptable conduct negotiated in relation to (perhaps mutually informing) characterisations of security threats and research practice?
• Combining insights from sociological and security studies, how can policy makers develop new approaches for minimising bioweapon threats through engagement with the bioscience community?
This project examined these issues through a research design
consisting of a series of inter-linked streams: a review of past national and
international attempts to establish codes of conduct in the biosciences and
to establish bounds of acceptable 'dual use' research; a
workshop for scientists regarding the appropriateness of introducing codes
of conduct in response to national security concerns; a literature review of
bioscientists' writing in scientific and medical journals regarding the definition,
legitimacy and threats of bioweapons.
For further
information see these related web pages:
| Biological Weapons & Codes of Conduct | The Life Sciences, Biosecurity & Dual USe Research |